'Responsio secundum Thomam' and the Search for an Early Thomistic School

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1. *The Paris and Oxford Condemnations and their Connection to Thomas Aquinas*

It has been generally assumed that following the aftermath of the Paris and Oxford condemnations of 1277 and 1284 respectively, in which important Thomistic theses[1] were at least indirectly compromised (in the case of the condemnation at Paris), a "movement" in defence of Thomas Aquinas' doctrine emerged which eventually resulted into a "Thomistic school".[2] The main representatives of this movement were not only defending the person of their fellow brother, but also "the meaning and implications" of the "Thomist innovations",[3] their acceptance of which constitutes the characteristic mark of the members of this movement. Thus as early as the 1280s there was a Thomistic school of thought being formed mainly as a response to ecclesiastical intervention, and led by a group of English and French Dominicans who understood the full import of the current Thomistic tenets.

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[1] Particularly the unicity of substantial form and the existence of matter without form. See William de la Mare's *Correctorium*, art. 31, 127-129, ed. P. Glorieux, in: *Les premières polémiques thomistes: Le Correctorium Corruptorii "Quare"*, Le Saulchoir, Kain 1927.

[2] See F.E. Kelley, *The Thomists and Their Opponents at Oxford in the Last Part of the Thirteenth Century*, unpublished PhD thesis, Oxford University 1977 (MS. Bodleian D.Phil. D. 6258), p. ii. Kelley's introductory passage runs as follows: "In the years following the 1277 condemnation of St. Thomas' teaching at Oxford until the end of the century, there appeared by way of reaction to the condemnation what one might call the *early Thomistic movement*. Its literary remains are ample enough to enable the historian to form a picture of the principal persons of this *school [. . .]*", p. i. (My italics) See also F.J. Roensch, *Early Thomistic School*, Dubuque, Iowa 1964, ix: "[. . .] the doctrine of the unicity of substantial form in creatures constituted the most basic yardstick by which to judge the character of any early Thomist at the time. [. . .]. It is by the acceptance or rejection of these theses [viz. the unicity of form, the pure potentiality of primary matter, the spirituality of separated substances] along with their correct understanding that the Thomism of an early defender of St. Thomas must be judged". Subsequently, Roensch embarks on a bio-bibliographical account of the representations of an "early English school" and an "early French school". Roensch, then, seems to make the same equation as Kelley between "Thomism" (i.e. a philosophical and/or theological allegiance to Aquinas' main tenets) and a "Thomistic school".

[3] Kelley 1977 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 2), 4. Also see F.E. Kelley, *Two Early English Thomists:*

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This approach, in its turn, has been based on a traditional understanding of the 1277 and 1284 condemnations, particularly that of 7 March 1277 in Paris.[4] According to this view, Bishop Stephen Tempier's condemnation was a reaction to "heterodox" Aristotelianism at the faculty of arts. Tempier was acting after the orders of Pope John XXI, who had asked him to conduct an inquiry concerning dangerous doctrines reported to be circulating at the University.[5] As a result, Tempier formed a commission of sixteen theologians, including Henry of Ghent, and had a list of 219 propositions drawn up somewhat hastily—so that the order of the propositions appears disorganised and the names of scholars behind these propositions do not appear specified. Without reporting back to the Pope, Tempier issued this condemnation on 7 March 1277 on his own authority. Within ten days, on 18 March, a prohibition by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Kilwardby, was issued in Oxford, this time envisioning directly Aquinas' thesis on the unicity of substantial form. On 29 October 1284, in a visit to the Oxford Chapter, John Pecham, Kilwardby's successor as Archbishop, ratified his predecessor's

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Thomas Sutton and Robert Orford vs. Henry of Ghent, in: The Thomist, 45 (1981), 345-87. Cf. D.A. Callus, *The Condemnation of St. Thomas at Oxford*, The Aquinas Society of London, no. 5 2nd ed. 1955 [1946[1]]. P. Glorieux, *Comment les thèses thomistes furent proscrites à Oxford (1284-1286)*, in: Revue Thomiste, 32 [nouv. série 10] (1927), 259-91, and *id., Les correctoires. Essai de mise au point*, in: Recherches de théologie et philosophie ancienne et médiévale, 14 (1947), 286-304, talks about a certain *milieu Thomiste* and a *école naissante* which he maintains emerged in Paris and Oxford in the midst of the aforesaid conflicts. Likewise, P. Mandonnet, *Premiers travaux de polémique thomiste*, in: Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, 7 (1913), 46-70 & 245-62. Also Roensch 1964 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 2), 19: "... early Dominicans not only defended St. Thomas, but understood his teaching in exactly the same way he did himself." See especially pp. 185-9.

[4] Among the main upholders of this view, are P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIII^e siècle*, 2 volumes, Louvain 1908-11, I, 28-9, 59-63, 142-95; F. Van Steenberghen, *Aristotle in the West*, Louvain 1955, 198-208; *id., La Philosophie au XIII^e siècle*, second ed., Louvain 1991, 354-59; and also by the latter, *Maître Siger de Brabant*, Louvain 1977, 149-58; R. Hissette, *Albert le Grand et Thomas d'Aquin dans la censure Parisienne du 7 mars 1277*, in: Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 15 (1982), 226-46, esp. 235, 237-41, 246; John F. Wippel, *Medieval Reactions to the Encounter Between Faith and Reason*, Milwaukee 1995; *id., Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277*, in: The Modern Schoolman, 72 (1995), 233-72. For Wippel, however, it is clear that, as contemporaries such as William de la Mare, Godfrey of Fontaines, and John of Naples indicate in their different ways, a number of the propositions condemned on 7 March 1277 were aimed directly at Aquinas (cf. Wippel 1995 (*Thomas Aquinas*), 241, 268-9). In this Wippel's position differs notably from that of Hissette, who believes that, although some of the propositions were common to masters of arts and Aquinas, the condemnation *indirectly* affected Aquinas.

[5] From a letter sent by John XXI to Stephen Tempier on 18 January 1277, ed. H. Denifle – E. Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, Paris 1889, I, 541. (Hereafter, *Chartularium*).

censure, and this time *condemned* the thirty "erroneous and ridiculous" propositions that the Oxford masters still maintained in disobedience of Kilwardby's censure.[6] The actual condemnation at Oxford is therefore seen as the deliberate intervention of a Franciscan, Pecham, who, being juridically incapable of enacting an explicit censure on Aquinas in Paris, ratified what was only a prohibition in Oxford. By extension, the censure of Thomistic theses has been perceived as a question of "Order rivalries", and of "Augustinian principles" *versus* "Aristotelian" metaphysics.[7]

Later contributions, however, have challenged the prevailing view of the condemnations. In order to revise the assumption that the Paris and Oxford condemnations led to the formation of an "early Thomistic school", it would be worthwhile to take a brief look at what these recent contributions tell us about the condemnations.

Based on the sources of the 1277 condemnation at Paris, Robert Wielockx[8] claims that Aquinas was object of a separate process both from the 7 March 1277 condemnation and from Giles of Rome's censure. Wielockx's main sources are (1) a letter written by Archbishop Pecham of Canterbury on 7 December 1284 to the Chancellor and Regent Masters at Oxford; (2) some remarks made by Henry of Ghent in the first version of his *Quodlibet* X, q.5 (1286); (3) remarks made by William de la Mare in his *Correctorium*.[9]

(1) As Wielockx interprets it, the letter by Pecham refers how Tempier, the Bishop of Paris, had thought about proceeding (*procedere cogitaret*) against Aquinas. However, during the vacancy in the Apostolic See after the death of John XXI (20 May 1277) and before the election of Nicholas III (25 November 1277), some cardinals of the Roman Curia ordered Tempier to abandon his cause. However, Pecham differentiated clearly the case from Oxford, and added that the canonical judgement regarding Aquinas was only restricted to Paris.[10]

(2) In Advent 1286, Henry of Ghent mentions in his *Quodlibet* X that ten years earlier (that is, between Christmas 1276 and Easter 1277),

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[6] *Chartularium*, 625.

[7] See particularly Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 3); Callus 1946/1955 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 3).

[8] R. Wielockx, *Autour du procès de Thomas d'Aquin*, in: A. Zimmermann (ed.), *Thomas von Aquin. Werk und Wirkung im Licht neuerer Forschungen*, Berlin 1988, 413-38. See also Wielockx,'s edition of Giles of Rome's *Apologia*, in: *Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia*, III, 1, Florence 1985, 92-6, 215-24.

[9] Wielockx 1988 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 8), 413.

[10] *Chartularium*, I, 624-6, n. 517. Wielockx 1988 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 8), 413-4.

Tempier, supported by the Papal Legate Simon de Brion, summoned a meeting in which the Parisian masters would have examined a number of articles, one of them literally corresponding to Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae* Ia, q.76, a.4 ("*Quod in homine est tantum una forma substantialis, scilicet anima intellectiva*"). According to Henry, at this meeting the masters had unanimously maintained, with only two exceptions, that the aforesaid thesis was false.[11]

(3) In his *Correctorium* (between 1277 and 1279), William de la Mare confirms the evidence given by Pecham and Henry of Ghent. According to William, the masters at Paris had reproved the thesis that in man there is only one substantial form. The formulation of the thesis again corresponds to Aquinas' *Summa* Ia., q.76, a.4.[12]

Wielockx adds further arguments in favour of a separate process against Aquinas, based on two aspects: on the one hand, the distinctive phrasing of the censured propositions as they appear in the three different censures. On the other hand, the slight chronological gap which separates the syllabus of 7 March 1277 from Giles of Rome's censure, and the latter from the process against Aquinas (whose articles are finally examined sometime between 2 April 1285 and 14 April 1286).[13] Whether Wielockx's thesis is accepted in its entirety or not, his main contribution resides in having connected the questioning of Aquinas' theses to Giles of Rome's censure.

Wielockx's thesis has received mainly two reactions, the first one by John F. Wippel,[14] and the second one by J.M.M.H. Thijssen.[15] As for Wippel, he revises Wielockx's view based on the three different sources advanced by him. According to the way Wippel reconstructs the evidence of Pecham's reference to Tempier and his plans to move against Aquinas, it is certain that Tempier was *thinking of* proceeding to a discussion of the

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[11] Text of Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibet* X edited by L. Hödl, *Neue Nachrichten über die Pariser Verurteilungen der thomasischen Formlehre*, in: Scholastik, 39 (1964), 178-96. Wielockx 1988 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 8), 414.

[12] For William's text, see Glorieux (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), 127-9.

[13] For Wielockx's proofs for the chronology for Aquinas' process in connection to Giles' censure, see Wielockx 1988 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 8), 422-30. For the chronology for Giles' censure in connection to the 7 March 1277 condemnation, see pp. 433-7.

[14] John F. Wippel, *Bishop Stephen Tempier and Thomas Aquinas: A Separate Process Against Aquinas?*, in: Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie, 44 (1997), 117-36.

[15] J.M.M.H. Thijssen, *Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris, 1200-1400*, Philadelphia 1998, 40-55. Thijssen treats this issue in more detail in *1277 Revisited: A new Interpretation of the Doctrinal Investigations of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome*, in: Vivarium, 35 (1997), 72-101.

articles in question but was prohibited from doing so until further notice. Wielockx, as Wippel sees it, seems to be reading something more into the text when he suggests that the process was already underway. Pecham's letter of itself, however, does not support this evidence.[16]

Similarly, Henry of Ghent's reference (Advent 1286) to the meeting of the masters in 1277[17] concerning the thesis of the unicity of substantial form, does not necessarily allude to a separate censure against Aquinas. Again, taken alone, Henry's text does not justify the conclusion that the meeting of the masters was summoned specifically to deal with Aquinas' views.[18]

Although Wippel acknowledges that William de la Mare's remarks in his *Correctorium* constitute an explicit statement concerning the masters' rejection of the unicity thesis, William's testimony is not however clear about whether the meeting of the masters was not simply a part of some other process (like Giles').[19]

In conclusion, as regards Wielockx's claim, Wippel considers that it still remains to be demonstrated whether the process coming after 7 March 1277 constitutes a separate censure against Aquinas. For it is possible that the later discussion on the unicity of substantial form was part of the meeting concerned with Giles' rehabilitation to University functions. Therefore, Wielockx's evidence, although possible, is not conclusive.[20]

Thijssen's main complaint about Wielockx's thesis is that the proposal of a separate inquiry against Aquinas presupposes that he was not directly targeted by any of the errors included in the syllabus of 7 March 1277. Furthermore, like Wippel, Thijssen also questions Wielockx's interpretation of the evidence and argues that it is not sufficiently compelling.[21]

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[16] Wippel 1997 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 14), 121-2.

[17] This episode must not be confused with another meeting reported by Henry of Ghent's X *Quodlibet*. This second meeting took place in 1285, when the regent and non-regent masters of theology gathered to examine a list of articles on the orders of Pope Honorius IV. Included in the list was the thesis on the unicity of substantial form. Again, all masters, except two dissenters, agreed that the article was false. See Thijssen 1997, (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), 76.

[18] Wippel 1997 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 14), 123-6.

[19] Wippel 1997 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 14), 126-30. Furthermore, at least in what regards the thesis of the possible existence of matter without form, contemporaries such as Richard Knapwell and John of Paris appear to doubt or even to deny that such meetings took place. For Richard, see Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), 116. For John of Paris, see Jean-Pierre Müller, *Le Correctorium Corruptorii "Circa" de Jean Quidort de Paris*, Rome 1941, 137.

[20] Wippel 1997 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 14), 135-6.

[21] Thijssen 1998 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), 53; Thijssen 1997 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), 72-3.

According to Thijssen, the testimonies put forward by Wielockx, namely that of John Pecham, Henry of Ghent, and William de la Mare, may also be explained as references to the inquiry against Giles of Rome.[22] What is decisive in their account, is that the latter inquiry concerns views of Aquinas. Thijssen believes that the process taking place at that time of Giles of Rome could be characterised as an investigation of Thomistic theses (viz. the unicity of substantial form, the existence of matter without form). Therefore, if we are to take into account Pecham's letter, the inquiry which was interrupted in 1277 by the command of the Roman Curia, could have well been Giles'. Moreover, the evidence concerning Giles of Rome's process and career after his conviction suggest that the case against him was suspended.[23] In agreement with Wielockx, Thijssen believes that the reason why the papal court might have interfered with the proceedings against Giles, is mainly due to a strong Dominican presence at the curia which happened also to be in favour of Aquinas.[24] Giles of Rome, therefore, escaped an official condemnation on account of the similarity between his theses and those of Aquinas.[25]

In conclusion, Thijssen holds that Tempier was involved in two doctrinal processes in 1277, both of which implied theses that were also held by Aquinas: one against unspecified members of the arts faculty (that of 7 March 1277), and another one against the theologian Giles of Rome—only the former having been brought to completion.[26]

Beyond his reaction to Wielockx's thesis, however, Thijssen's main contribution to the discussion over the understanding of the 1277 condemnation is twofold. On the one hand, Thijssen connects the events leading up to 7 March 1277 with the process against Siger of Brabant.[27]

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[22] Thijssen 1997 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), 87-8.

[23] Thijssen 1998 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), 54-5; Thijssen 1997 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), 90-101.

[24] See Wielockx 1988 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 8), 427-9. According to Wielockx, the abstention of two masters (in 1277 and 1285) from censuring some Thomistic theses as false (reported by Henry in his *Quodlibet* X) indicates that they were two Dominican regent masters, and that they counted with the support from the Dominican authorities, both at Paris and at the papal court. The Order had powerful protectors at the curia: cardinal Giovanni Gaetano Orsini, cardinal Giacomo Savelli, William of Moerbeke. (See A. Potthast, *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum inde ab anno 1198 ad annum 1304*, t. 2, Berlin 1875.) Moreover, John of Verceil, the General Master of the Dominicans at Paris from 1264 to 1283, was favourable to Aquinas, as can be concluded from the General Chapters at Milan (1278) and Paris (1279) presided by him.

[25] Thijssen 1998 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), 55.

[26] Thijssen 1998 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), 55; Thijssen 1997 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), 95-101.

[27] Thijssen 1998 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), 44-9.

On the other hand, and more to our purpose, Thijssen connects Aquinas' theses to the members of the arts faculty as target of the 1277 condemnation. The targets of the 1277 condemnation are unspecified members of the arts faculty at Paris—in fact, they could have well been students and not necessarily masters.[28] Thijssen considers, therefore, that one of the reasons why it has seemed so difficult to identify the names behind the condemned errors, is that the examination[29] has been based on the assumption that Tempier's condemnation only envisioned faculty of arts masters. Some propositions may well be connected to Arabic sources and others could be derived from the teaching of theologians such as Aquinas, but propagated by arts members.[30]

Based on the discussion above, this article will take into account three main ideas concerning our understanding of the Paris and Oxford condemnations. First, the two condemnations, although connected, belong to different proceedings and respond to different situations in Paris and in Oxford. The Paris condemnation of 7 March 1277 envisioned a series of general theses pronounced or propagated by members of the arts faculty, some of the theses entailing problematic theological repercussions. Whether or not attempting to disguise a particular target, it is clear that Bishop Tempier wanted to check a general intellectual tendency in the arts faculty the full import of which could prove detrimental to certain matters of dogma. In this light, Archbishop Kilwardby's action at Oxford in 1277 could well be seen as a prudential procedure inspired by the recent measures taken at Paris. As for the condemnation carried out by Pecham in 1284, it is most likely that its more explicit character is due to certain contumacy on the part of Oxford masters who had been resisting Kilwardby's authority. In that case, Pecham, as Tempier and Kilwardby himself, could have initially only intended a general admonitory word against intellectual trends with controversial theological significance. Pecham's further action against individual Oxford Dominicans (like Knapwell in 1286) could have well been caused by provocative action on the

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[28] In support of this claim, Thijssen quotes from the preface to the 1277 condemnation: "[. . .] nonulli Parisius *studentes* in artibus". (*Chartularium*, I, 542.) My italics.

[29] Notably Hissette's, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277*, Louvain-Paris 1977, 317.

[30] Thijssen 1998 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), 50-2. Note that also Wippel 1997 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 14) argues in favour of this view. Also Wippel's 1995 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 4), 269, were he states that contemporaries such as William de la Mare, Godfrey of Fontaines, and John of Naples indicate in different ways how they thought that a number of the articles of 7 March 1277 had been aimed directly at Aquinas.

part of Oxford members. That they happened to be Dominicans is understandable, for they were perhaps incited by a certain *esprit de corps* to defend the name and the person of a fellow brother—this time affected directly by an explicit condemnation.

Second, whether or not there was a separate process undertaken against Aquinas, what is important for our purposes is that the 1277 condemnation at Paris already envisions Aquinas' theses. Although nominally the censure concerned the arts faculty, it involved theological theses, or at least theses propounded by theologians. As far as Aquinas' unicity thesis is concerned, it was considered worrisome for theological reasons—something which appears clearer at the Oxford condemnation.[31] In any case, the unicity thesis is ultimately a medieval interpretation of Aristotelian physics, and to that extent it was more likely to appeal to the artists than the theologians.

Third, Dominicans and Franciscans were not evenly distributed in favour of Aquinas and the condemnations respectively, in a way that could suggest a "partisan" reading of the events. It is a matter of fact that already at the time of the 1277 condemnation there were Dominicans at important posts who happened to favour Aquinas—but whether they subscribed to his views, or were rather attempting to prevent a partisan development of the affairs, is uncertain. On the other hand, there were also influential Dominicans, notably Robert Kilwardby, Archbishop of Canterbury, and William of Hothum, prior of England, who explicitly rejected the unicity of substantial form thesis. In William's case, the defence of Aquinas seems to have responded either to a desire to safeguard the Order's dignity, or to theological priorities.[32]

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[31] In Pecham's letter of 7 December 1284, we read how the repercussions on theological matters (as the numerical identity of the bodies after resurrection) prompted him above all to "detest" the error propounded by Aquinas. Most interestingly, it is *upon hearing this* (i.e. the theological repercussions) that William of Hothum is purported to have acquiesced to Pecham's cause. See *Chartularium*, I, 624-26, n. 517. Cf. Thijssen 1997 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), 83-5.

[32] In this respect, Pecham's letter of 7 December 1284 is of particular interest in what it reveals of William of Hothum's attitude towards the censured Thomistic theses. In that letter, Pecham reports on an earlier conversation he had entertained with William regarding Pecham's attitude towards the Dominican Order. But apart from Pecham's reassuring remarks on how his renewing Kilwardby's 1277 prohibition does not bear ill will against the Dominicans, it is William's response to Pecham's allegations which are of interest. Upon hearing about the theological repercussions of the unicity thesis, William replies to Pecham that he may surely condemn this error with his knowledge and consent (*hunc errorem secure de mea conscientia condemnetis*), *Chartularium*, I, 624-6, n. 517.

Closely connected to the bipartisan view of these events, is the handling of authorities, in particular Aristotle and Augustine. Aristotle has been traditionally considered as the main influence for the unicity of substantial form thesis, while the pluralists are seen as primarily indebted to Augustine. As will be seen, however, the sources behind the unitarian or the pluralist thesis are much less clear-cut and often overlap.

Based on the revised view of the Paris and Oxford condemnations, the purpose of this study is to reexamine the statement that, as a result of the condemnations, a "Thomistic school" had emerged by the end of the thirteenth century. This examination will be carried out in three stages. First, it will attempt to give a definition of "school" according to what the term could have signified by the end of the thirteenth century. Second, focusing specifically on the question of the unicity of substantial form, the main tenets of the unitarian and pluralist outlooks will be outlined. The purpose is a fairer assessment of the sources and authorities behind Aquinas' thesis and the pluralist view. Third, and inasmuch as the unicity thesis was perceived as entailing problematic theological consequences, we will concentrate on the specific theological issue of the numerical identity of Christ's body living and dead. This was perceived as perhaps the most crucial theological question in relation to the significance of the unicity thesis. The development of this theological issue will be followed first in Aquinas, then in William de la Mare as a negative reaction to Aquinas' view, and finally, as positive reactions to Aquinas' thesis, in two members of the Dominican Order, namely Richard Knapwell (from Oxford) and Giles of Lessines (from Paris). The way in which Richard and Giles handle the full implications of the unicity theory in contrast to William de la Mare's, might prove relevant for an assessment of the nature of the Dominican defence of Aquinas which emerged at the end of the thirteenth century.

2. *The Definition of a "School"*[33]

By "school" we generally understand a "school of thought", as a body of people or pupils adhering to a certain set of principles, doctrines, methods, or authorities. The cohesion of this group of people is based on their fixed allegiance to that doctrine or set of principles, an allegiance which

[33] For the senses in which we can speak of "schools" before the fourteenth century, this article will be mainly based on W.J. Courtenay, *Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England*, Princeton, N.J. 1987, 171-5.

is clearly differentiated from simple prejudice in that it is not motivated by unreasoned opinion. Thus, the adherence to a school should presuppose a "speculative awareness" of the doctrine which the school represents, in the sense that the members of the school should understand the full implications of the doctrine and according to that choose to adhere to that particular view.

By the end of the thirteenth century, however, the term "school" was never understood in this sense as a "school of thought" attached to an abstract ideological current, but it was always personified in the doctrine of a leading figure in a way still too individualistic. Just like Peter Abelard in the twelfth century, Aquinas attracted both followers and critics. It was the way in which these individual figures exercised reason within a theological question, which aroused either censure or adherence. What the late thirteenth-century scholar associated with the term "school" was a place of study and its standard curriculum of teaching, rather than a specific philosophical commitment. Thus, a "Dominican school" did not necessarily imply a particular doctrinal *credo*, but more immediately referred to the masters that belonged to the Order. In this sense, Kilwardby was no less a member of the Dominican school than enthusiastic defenders of Aquinas such as Knapwell and John of Paris.

By the same token, a "school" was not necessarily constrained by geographical factors, as it was not determined by membership to one particular university. The terminology and sources used by the late thirteenth-century masters reveal the close connection between the learning in Paris and Oxford. Indeed, it would be futile to draw differences between the approach and methods of the Oxford and Parisian masters in an attempt to delineate two separated "schools". By the end of the thirteenth century intellectual figures such as Robert Kilwardby, John Pecham, and William de la Mare belonged to the Parisian world as much as to Oxford and many of them had in fact been sent to Paris to obtain their doctorate.[34] Oxford theologians were concerned primarily with issues of Parisian origin, and Aquinas' theses were seen as one of these imports. There was a unity in the intellectual traditions of the two universities which was expressed in the same methods, terminology, and subjects of discussion, as the *correctoria* literature testifies. Both Oxford and Paris produced treatises as well as defensive works. Giles of Lessines handled the

[34] For the Parisian influence in English education, cf. Courtenay 1987 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 33), 147-51, where he questions the notion of a "school of thought" in thirteenth-century scholastic landscape.

matter under discussion as soberly as did Thomas Sutton, and Richard Knapwell's *Quare* served as a reference to John of Paris'[35] own reply to William de la Mare.

Therefore, the centripetal force that was at work in the Dominican Order between 1280 and 1305 conferring some uniformity of teaching into it was not necessarily indicative of a "school of thought". Rather, this force partly responded to a defensive move against the condemnations of 1277, and partly to a rivalry with the Franciscans for intellectual superiority. This correspondence between a religious order (Dominicans, Augustinians, Franciscans) and a particular teaching tradition (Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Scotus) was however temporary and began to disappear by the first half of the fourteenth century. It is significant in this respect that already at the beginning of the fourteenth century there was a shift in intellectual interests as Oxford began to define itself independently of Paris. Followers of Aquinas never reached the stature that later Franciscan figures such as Ockham achieved. Franciscans became a decisive presence in Oxford when they began to send their students there rather than to Paris, and the exclusive reference to Aquinas in Oxford remained as a trend peculiar to the last part of the thirteenth century. The affinitive connection between Oxford and Paris was, therefore, a temporary feature determined by the events surrounding 1277. It was the theological consensus which reigned outside the Dominican Order which acted as one of the principal corrosive forces on the adherence to Thomistic teaching, particularly in Oxford. As we shall see, this theological consensus is particularly manifest in the debate over the unicity of form thesis.

3. *Unicity and Plurality of Forms: Basic Principles and Sources*

Both the pluralists and the unitarians were agreed that the origin of the intellectual soul was creation. The conflict between them rather consisted in defining the relation between the intellect and other faculties of the soul. Aquinas avoids the issue altogether by discarding one of the terms. To the question "Is it possible that a composite be essentially one, if there co-exist many substantial forms?" he states that the rational soul suffices as the source of man's existence, and that once it arrives, the sensitive soul and the forms which precede it will disappear. It is superfluous

[35] John Quidort of Paris wrote the *Correctorium "Circa"* sometime before 1284, and after Knapwell's *Quare*. Cf. *Le Correctorium corruptorii "Circa" de Jean Quidort de Paris*, ed. Müller 1941 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 19).

to assume a plurality of forms in a single composite substance. The real unity of being requires the unicity of the formal principle: *ens et unum convertuntur*.[36]

Essentially, the doctrine of the unicity of substantial form is an interpretation of Aristotelian physics, and is deeply rooted in the theory of hylemorphism.[37] The qualification of form as "substantial" is of great importance and must not be overlooked. The substantial form, according to Aquinas, is the absolute determining principle, the sole source of perfection and activity in the composite. Consequently, it is not possible for a composite substance to have more than one substantial form. This is held on the grounds that the *existence* of one composite is due to the presence of one *form*: "substantial" form and "one" form are therefore equivalent terms. In the case of human beings, the intellectual soul (and not the vegetative or the sensitive soul) is ultimately man's substantial form in that it is the principle which accounts for man being a human and not an animal substance. What makes a human being such is the intellectual soul. Therefore, the intellectual soul—and not the sensitive—is what makes man a human substance and what differentiates him from an animal. The vegetative soul (or power) and the sensitive soul (or power) are also principles of actuality in a human composite in that they are also forms. But they are not be "substantial" forms because although they can explain how a human being belongs to the wider realm of living beings which includes plants and animals, they are not what defines a human being as such. What it is to be a human being is only ultimately explained by the intellectual soul.

This tenet responds to Aquinas' belief that in all corporeal beings, apart from the matter-form composition, there is composition between essence and existence (*esse*). In introducing the notion of an act of being (*esse*)

[36] For the main passages containing the metaphysical premises of the unicity of substantial form and the principles that follow, cf. Aquinas, *Ia*, q.76, a.3; *Contra Gentiles*, II, c.57; *In De anima*, II, lect.1.

[37] The theory of hylemorphism constitutes the basis of Aristotelian physics. Physics, as Aristotle understood it, is the science of nature as a whole. Natural objects are those which have a capacity for change or movement within themselves, and physics is therefore the science of such natural changes and of the objects themselves which change. Hylemorphism is the doctrine of matter and form as the principles of change. Every living being is composed of matter and form, matter (identified with the body) being what possesses potentiality and form (identified with the soul) what possesses actuality. Change, in these terms, is the gradual acquisition of a form and the bringing to actuality of potential matter. The doctrine of potentiality and actuality thus draws attention to the continuity of natural change.

which even actualises the form, Aquinas was making a plurality of forms unnecessary. For if "form" is understood as the proper receiver of the act of being, the composition of *esse* with several forms would necessarily entail several substantial forms, and hence several actually existing beings. It is a feature of the unicity thesis, therefore, to identify form with actuality—something which is not necessarily the case in the pluralist view.[38]

Since for Aquinas the one and only being (*esse*) a substance has comes entirely and immediately from the actualising form, all preceding forms must disappear.[39] Whatever is posterior to this actualising form is consequently accidental (and not substantial) to the composite. In other words, *non fit motus in substantia*. The distinction between an accidental form and a substantial form is crucial for Aquinas, and is one of his main reasons for not accepting a plurality of forms. Whereas the recipient of a substantial form is something which is pure potentiality, an accidental form arrives in something which is already an actual existent. If, following the pluralist claim, there is more than one substantial form in a composite, already the lowest form would satisfy the conditions for a substantial form. Moreover, any higher form would be characterised as an accidental form, since it would arrive in an already existing substance. The difference between a substantial and an accidental form, then, would no longer hold unless we accept a unitarian principle.

One of the consequences of this teaching is to deny "universal hylemorphism". Defenders of this theory generally held that all beings, apart from God, are composed in that they include potentiality (i.e. matter). It was believed that in man there are two instances of matter, one which is intrinsic to his soul and inseparable from the form of his soul, and another which is extrinsic to the soul and is the corporeal matter of the body.[40] According to Aquinas, by contrast, the presence of matter within

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[38] See Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, c.5; *De potentia*, VII, 2; *Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, c.54; *ST* Ia, q.3, a.4; q.5, a.3.

[39] See Aquinas, *ST* Ia, q.118, a.2, ad 2 (this had particular consequences on embryology). The superior form replaces the inferior one and produces the effects that the latter was capable of causing. There are no intermediate forms; being pure actuality, a form cannot pre-exist or be "virtually" contained in another. Consequently, the union between prime matter and substantial form is immediate. See also Aquinas, *De spiritualibus creaturis*, a.3; *SCG*, cc.57 and 58.

[40] Aquinas traced this doctrine back to the *Fons Vitae* of Avicebron (see Aquinas *De ente*, c.4). Defenders of this position, notably Bonaventure, attempted to show that it owed its origin to Augustine. See Bonaventure, *Commentarius in quattuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, in: *Opera omnia*, Ad Claras Aquas (Quaracchi) 1882-1902, II, d.17, a.1, q.2. William de la Mare, for example, was aware of the support which Augustine could provide for the doctrine of spiritual matter, and in this spirit William profits from texts such as *Confessions*

an intelligence is incompatible with the latter's capacity to perform intellectual operations.[41] Prime matter[42] has no actuality whatsoever unless united to a form; it is pure potentiality, it has no properties, and is therefore unintelligible.

Thus, Aquinas' main tenets concerning the unicity of substantial form were also accompanied by basic principles of Aristotelian physics, not necessarily deduced of themselves from the axiom of convertibility of being and unity. Two instances of such an incorporation of Aristotelian physics by Aquinas are the potential character of prime matter and the unintelligibility of prime matter of itself. Note, however, that the conception of prime matter as pure potentiality and unintelligible does not of itself form part of the debate over the unicity of substantial form. However, such an understanding of prime matter did contribute to give rise to the debate, insofar as the denial of all actuality in matter at least calls for a union of matter and form where the latter plays an exclusive actualising role in the composite as the sole source of perfection. Moreover, a prime matter which had no positive value whatsoever was problematic in accounting for continuity in natural change.

As for the pluralists, they rarely agree in their accounts of matter and form and the relation between the two, beyond an acceptance of certain degree of actuality in matter—something strictly connected to their theological and doctrinal concerns. The general pluralist view defines matter in terms of accounts of change whereby matter stands independently from the form.[43] However, a double conception of matter is generally

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XII, 6, and the *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 5, 5, in which Augustine had tentatively attributed matter to all living beings. See William de la Mare, *Correctorium*, ed. Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), 49-50.

[41] See Aquinas, *Le "De ente et essentia" de s. Thomas d'Aquin*, ed. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, Paris 1948, 31-2.

[42] Note that "prime matter" is not necessarily the same as "matter". "Matter" is described by Aristotle (*Metaphysics* VII, 3, 1029a20-21) as "that which in itself is neither a something nor a quantity nor any of those other things by which a thing is determined". This led some thinkers such as Aquinas, Albert, and Giles of Rome, to view matter as pure potentiality, that is, as completely devoid of actuality and of itself apart from its corresponding substantial form. Matter in this sense was called "prime matter", in that it is not understood within the composite. "Matter" (and not "prime matter"), on the other hand, is usually described as the principle of potentiality in a composite, that which subsists under the change of form and is therefore actualised by form. For the notion of "prime matter" as it was propounded by Aristotle and its later interpretations, see Arthur Hyman's article, *Aristotle's 'First Matter' and Avicenna's and Averroes' 'Corporeal Form'*, in: H.A. Wolson and L.W. Schwarz (eds.), *Harry A. Wolfson Jubilee Volume*, Jerusalem 1965, vol. 1, 385-406.

[43] For the common metaphysical principles of the pluralist view in the thirteenth cen-

maintained, where we find firstly a simple matter, that is, the subject of substantial form, and secondly, matter as the subject of change. Avicenna and Averroes, attempting to harmonise the two accounts, set out to show how "first matter" could also be said to be a substance. As part of this attempt, they introduced the notion of "corporeal form" to show that "first matter" was a substance in the sense of having some sort of "form". Thus, "matter" can be seen either as pure potentiality, or as an active potentiality, and it is in the latter sense that one could speak of a *forma corporeitatis*.[44]

Henceforth, the commentators' accounts of "corporeal form" became an element of medieval discussions about "first matter". The notion of a "corporeal form" was then conceived as an *inchoatio formae*.[45] Those who in the thirteenth century admitted in nature an *inchoatio formae* held that matter possessed an active potentiality translated in an initial activity, so that the distinct and complete form to be achieved at the end of the generative process existed already, if incomplete, within matter's active power.[46] The notion of an *inchoatio formae*, therefore, supposes the development of an imperfect form into a more perfect one, thus excluding the possibility of a succession of forms. For this reason, the notion of an "original form" as some sort of material principle remains irreconcilable with the unitarian thesis.

As the pluralist thesis saw it, closely related to the notion of a corporeal form were two principles, mainly identified with Augustine: universal

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tury, see R. Zavalloni, *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes*, in Louvain 1951, 310-4.

[44] For the tracing of the connected notions of "prime matter" and "corporeal form" and their introduction to medieval discussions, see Hyman's article (*op. cit.*, above, n. 42). For the relevant passages in Avicenna, see *Al-Shifa*, Metaphysics IV, 2, 85v, 2; II, 2, 75r, 2; *On Definition*, translated to the French by A.M. Goichon, *Introduction à Avicenne*, Paris 1933, 60, 394-5. For Averroes, see *De Substantia Orbis* I, V, 320r, B; *Long Commentary on Physics* I, com. 63, IV, 29v, D; com. 70, IV, 32r, C; *Long Commentary on Metaphysics* VII, com. 9.

[45] The term *inchoatio formae* appears for the first time in Robert Grosseteste, *De luce seu de inchoatione formarum*, ed. L. Baur, in: *Die philosophische Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln*, Münster/W 1912, 51 ff. Grosseteste sees life as the first form, which impresses spatial dimensions in matter. This first form Grosseteste explicitly identifies with Avicenna's *forma corporeitatis*. The term, therefore, of *inchoatio formae*, appears only in Scholasticism. However, as will be seen, the conception behind the term was traced back by scholastics to denote Augustine's doctrine of seminal reasons.

[46] For those scholastics who supported this view, see Peter of Tarantasia, *Sent.* II, d.18, q.1; Bonaventure, *Sent.* II, d.18, q.1, a.2. For those against the notion of an *inchoatio formae*, see notably Giles of Rome, *In De Physico auditu*, II, lect.1, dub.9: *Sent.* II, d.1, p. 1, q.2, a.4; d.18, q.2, a.1; *Quodlibet* II, q.22.

hylemorphism[47] and the *rationes seminales*.[48] According to the first, if the soul, too, is a compound of matter and form, then it must be understood as a substance susceptible to intrinsic change and not as the only and immutable principle of all being in the composite. The vegetative and sensitive souls can coexist with the intellectual soul, all playing a part in the composite's being and perfection.[49] According to the second principle, matter is believed to contribute in the constitution of a new substance in virtue of an actual set of properties of which it has been endowed in its own right. Matter, it is argued, has some degree of actuality, that is, it is a positive entity which is capable of being perfected by the intel-

[47] The question of whether the theory of universal hylemorphism was as such pronounced by Augustine or whether it was at least inherent to Augustine's natural philosophy, is much debated. Thomas of York, for example, believed that such a theory formed part of Augustine's thought (see Thomas of York, *Sapientale*, Vat.Lat. 6771, fol. 88d, quoted by Zavalloni 1951 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 43), 443). Some passages in Augustine, however, could support the view that he attributed some matter-form composition to the soul. See Augustine, *Literal Commentary on Genesis*, VII, c.6, PL 34, col. 359, n. 9: "Fortasse potuit et anima, antequam ea ipsa natura fieret, quae anima dicitur, cuius vel pulchritudo virtus, vel defformitas virtium est, *habere aliquam materiam pro suo genere spiritualem*" [*De genesi ad litteram*, ed. J. Zycha, Prague-Vienna-Leipzig 1894, 224-5]. My italics. See also *ibid.*, VII, c.27, PL 34, col. 369, n. 39 [ed. Zycha, 206]. The attributions of the theory of universal hylemorphism in the thirteenth century make up a rather heterogeneous lot. Aquinas attributes it to Avicebron in his *De ente et essentia*, c.4; *Sent.* II, d.3, q.1, a.1. See also A. Forest, *La structure métaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris 1931 [2e éd. 1956], 109-10. Bonaventure tends to identify it with Augustine, in his *Sent.* II, d.17, a.1, q.2; II, d.18, a.2, q.1; II, d.17, a.2, q.2, ad 6. Among modern scholars, F. Van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIII^e siècle*, Louvain 1966, 46-7, 150, 245-46, 249, sees universal hylemorphism as Avicebron's influence. Zavalloni 1951 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 43), 422, 442, on the other hand, rather stresses the Augustinian influence.

[48] The conception of a corporeal form, and for that matter of an *inchoatio formae*, was seen as akin to Augustine's notion of *seminal reasons* in that in both cases we find the idea of principles of (material) production, the nature of which is potentiality. As we find it in Augustine, seminal reasons are latent germs which contain all the creatures which are to be gradually developed in time. See Augustine, *De Trinitate*, III, c.9, PL 42, col. 877, n. 16 [ed. W.J. Mountain, Turnhout 1968 (CC 50), 143]; *Literal Commentary on Genesis*, VI, c.11, PL 34, col. 346, n. 18 [ed. Zycha (*op. cit.*, above, n. 47), 183-5] Seminal reasons have their own nature and efficiency, on account of which a human being engenders another human being and not an animal of another species. See Augustine, *Literal Commentary on Genesis*, IX, c.17, PL 34, col. 406, n. 32 [ed. Zycha, 290-2]. The latter supported the view which identifies seminal reasons with an *inchoatio formae*, and the efficient principle of seminal reasons with a certain actuality in matter. However, the notion of a corporeal form was, as we have seen, most likely introduced into the West through two decisively Aristotelian authors, namely Avicenna and Averroes.

[49] Examples of this view are found in Bonaventure, *Sent.* II, d.17, a.1, q.2, ad 6; Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones de anima* XIII, q.4 (*Aedil.* 164, fol. 80v), ed. A.-J. Gondras, Paris 1961, 51-73. Cf. Zavaloni 1951 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 43), 311.

lectual soul.[50] Once separated, we can still refer to a cadaver as the same body because it preserves an actuality of its own which is independent from the soul. Form is only a determining principle which prepares the composite for subsequent determinations. In this context, then, "potentiality" and "actuality" are understood in a way unintelligible under the unitarian principles. Whereas Aquinas and his followers clearly distinguish actuality from potentiality and assign them separately to form and matter respectively, the pluralists believe in a *materia universalis* and a *forma universalis*. Form in this context can be said to possess a certain potentiality in that a pre-existent form can be superseded and intrinsically perfected by a new form.[51] There is, therefore, a "subordination" of forms—a claim which immediately clashes with the unitarian belief in the immutability of form.

As far as the sources go, mainly Augustine and Aristotle have been alternatively claimed as authorities for either the unitarian or the pluralist view. There is a general consensus among modern scholars, however, in identifying Augustine as the main pluralist influence, and in seeing Aristotelian physics as befitting the unitarian thesis.[52] Avicebron, as another main source, has enjoyed more unanimity in being identified as the

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[50] In support of this claim, pluralists have appealed in particular to a passage of Augustine's *Confessions*, XII, 6 (PL 32, col. 828, n. 6 [ed. L. Verheijen, Turnhout 1981, CC 27, 218-9]), where he states that matter is "something intermediate between form and nothingness (*propre nihil*)", and that matter is in fact a "nihil aliquid". The "aliquid" was enough to argue for some form in matter. This is furthermore supported by Augustine's statement that matter informs insofar as it can receive a form (*De vera religione*, c.18, PL 34, col. 137, n. 36 [ed. J. Martin, Turnhout 1962 (CC 32), 209]).

[51] This entails that to each essential perfection corresponds a different substantial form. By the same token, every being implies a different form for each of its operations. This multiplicity of forms in a substance, however, expresses a hierarchy which accounts for the unity of the composite. For expressions of this tenet in scholastics, see Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. B. Jansen, Ad Claras Aquas (Quaracchi) 1922-26, 50; Richard of Mediavilla, *De gradu formarum*, ed. Zavalloni 1951 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 43), 140; Bonaventure, *Sent.* II, d.15, a.1, q.2, ad 3. Cf. Zavalloni 1951, 310.

[52] See for example G. Théry, *L'augustinisme médiéval*, in: *Acta Hebdomadae Augustinianae-Thomisticae*, Turin-Rome 1931, 140-200, on p. 146; E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, 3rd ed., London 1989, 416-20. In other cases (which to our judgement do not fundamentally disagree with the previous), the conflict is not seen as one of Aristotelianism *versus* Augustinianism, but of unequally developed forms of Aristotelianism, where Aquinas' is often considered the more authentic. See Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant d'après ses œuvres inédites*, vol. 2: *Siger dans l'histoire de l'aristotélisme*, Louvain 1942, 719; Zavalloni 1951 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 43), 422, where he ascribes a direct and decisive influence of Augustine over the pluralist view; pp. 472-73, where he speaks of a "contaminated Aristotelianism"; M. De Wulf, *Le traité "De unitate formae" de Gilles de Lessines*, Louvain 1901, 13, where he speaks of "peripatétisme faussé" in referring to the pluralist understanding of the philosopher.

primary forerunner of the pluralist view.[53] In assessing these sources, however, a main distinction should be made between what can be attributed to each of these authorities as part of their doctrinal principles, and what has been claimed from them by unitarians or pluralists for the sake of polemical argument against the opposite view.

To start with the least controversial, the fundamental principle leading Avicebron's doctrine as shown in his *Fons Vitae* is the conception of universal matter and universal form. Except for God, all substances are composed of matter and form.[54] What distinguishes one creature from another is the addition of a single or many complementary forms, according to which each creature is determined as a simple mineral, a plant, an animal, or a human being. This represents a clear propounding of universal hylemorphism, and to that extent it seems fair to state that Avicebron is at least one of the sources behind the pluralist view.[55] R. Zavalloni,[56] on the other hand, has identified Philip the Chancellor as a more proximate influence of the pluralist doctrine.[57] Philip appeared to have propounded a plurality of forms in connection with universal hylemorphism approximately forty years before the first condemnations. Although admitting that Avicebron's influence upon the pluralist conception is remarkable, Zavalloni holds that he must not be considered as the theory's exclusive or preponderant forerunner. For that matter, more

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[53] In *The condemnation of St Thomas at Oxford* (*op. cit.*, above, n. 3) Callus affirms that "there can be no doubt that the pluralist theory is the offspring of the Jewish philosopher Avicebron, through his *Fons Vitae*." And De Wulf, in his study of Giles of Lessines' *De unitate formae* (*op. cit.*, above, n. 52), 20: "L'interpretation franciscaine de la matière et de la forme est pleinement contenue dans le *Fons Vitae* d'Avicebron . . . Avicebron est le corrupteur de la theorie hylémorphique."

[54] Avicebron, *Avancebrolis Fons Vitae ex Arabico in Latinum translatus ab Johanne Hispano et Dominico Gundissalino*, ed. Cl. Baeumker, Münster 1892-95, I, c.5, p. 7; II, c.24, p. 69; III, 23, p. 133; III, 26, p. 142, V, 18, p. 290; III, 32, pp. 154-155 ("Formae substantiae compositae multae sunt"); IV, c.1, p. 211; IV, c.5, p. 220; V, c.12, p. 278. See also Zavalloni 1951 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 43), 421.

[55] In this respect it is important to note that, although universal hylemorphism could well be seen as implying a plurality of forms, the converse is not equally true. If we admit that the soul is composed of matter and form, the union of soul and body does not consist in the union of correlative principles, but of two substances to some extent determined, if incomplete. However, to hold that form is a dispositive principle and matter somehow a positive entity (as the pluralist doctrine has been more or less characterised), does not necessarily entail that all beings apart from God are composed of matter and form. Insofar as the pluralist thesis is seen as implying universal hylemorphism, the connection between the two could be considered a legitimate one.

[56] Zavalloni 1951 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 43), 422.

[57] See Philippus Cancellarius Parisiensis, *Summa de bono*, ed. N. Wicki, Bern 1985.

than to Avicebron, the pluralists are indebted to Avicenna who—as we saw—developed the notion of a corporeal form from Aristotle's physics and metaphysics.[58] Avicenna (and for that matter also Averroes) sets out to show how Aristotle's "prime matter" could also be said to be a substance. As part of this attempt, he posited the notion of "corporeal form" to show that "prime matter" was a substance in the sense of having some kind of "form".[59]

In the case of Augustine, mainly two pluralist principles are claimed to have derived from his doctrine: one, that there is some actuality in matter, or more precisely, the notion of a corporeal form; the other, universal hylemorphism. As for the first principle, it has been clearly stated that it was introduced into the West by two decisively Aristotelian authors, namely Avicenna and Averroes. In fact, it is doubtful whether Augustine ever spoke explicitly of a *forma corporeitatis*. However, the notion might have been perceived as possessing an Augustinian character inasmuch as some passages in Augustine appear to describe matter as a positive entity. The theory of matter in Augustine is closely connected to the doctrine of creation, and hence the relation usually found between the notion of a corporeal form and Augustine's *ratio seminalis*. The latter at least calls upon a pluralist thesis inasmuch as it admits the perfectibility of substantial form. Indeed, the *rationes seminales* execute the simultaneous creation of all creatures, and as such have some "form"—if incomplete—which develops into something complete and more perfect. Moreover, in his *Literal Commentary on Genesis*, Augustine speaks of an *informis materia*,[60] the nature of which has been interpreted from other passages in his works as possessing some positive value.[61] In the *Confessions* we find matter being

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[58] For Avicenna and the notion of "corporeal form", see Hyman's article 1965 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 42), 395-403.

[59] Avicenna, *Al-Shifa*, Metaphysics II, 2, 75r, 2; IV, 2, 85v, 2; *On Definitions*, trans. to French by A.M. Goichon, *Introduction à Avicenne*, Paris 1933, 60, 394-395.

[60] Augustine, *Literal Commentary on Genesis*, I, c.15, PL 34, col. 257, n. 29 [ed. Zycha 1894 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 47), 21, 7-15]: "Non quia informis materia formatis rebus tempore prior est, cum sit utrumque simul concreatum, et unde factum est, et quod factum. Sicut enim vox materia est verborum, verba vero formatam vocem indicant [. . .] ita creator Deus non priore tempore fecit informem materiam." Also *Lit. Comm. on Genesis*, V, c. 5, PL 34, col. 326, n. 13 [ed. Zycha, 146, 6-8]: "Non itaque temporali, sed causali ordine prius facta est informis formabilisque materies, et spiritualis et corporalis, de qua fieret quod faciendum esset". Cf. *De Gen. Contra Manich.*, II, c.3, PL 34, col. 198, n. 4.

[61] In what follows, we will be referring to specific passages in the following works by Augustine: *Confessions* XII, 6, PL 32, col. 828, n. 6 [ed. Verheijen 1981 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 50], 218-9]; *Literal Commentary on Genesis*, *lib. imperf.*, IV, c.12, PL 34, col. 224 [ed. Zycha

described as something intermediary between form and nothingness (*propre nihil*) in the sense of a *nihil aliquid*, which has served as support for asserting in matter some kind of form. This statement has been seen as further confirmed by a passage of *De vera religione* were Augustine holds that matter informs insofar as it can receive a form.[62] There is, then, an Augustinian resonance to the notion of a corporeal form (which in Scholasticism was also identified to the idea of an *inchoatio formae*), inasmuch as in some passages in Augustine matter is found described as possessing some degree of formality. The notion of a corporeal form as such, however, is of a clear Aristotelian background.

As for the doctrine of universal hylemorphism, which also profited from Augustine's authority, it is closely related to the pluralist doctrine of form as "dispositive principle". For if the soul is constituted of matter and form, the union of body and soul, rather than signifying a pure potentiality being entirely informed by an active principle, entails somehow two substances in some way determined although incomplete. Some advocates of the pluralist thesis have maintained that universal hylemorphism is inherent in Augustine's natural philosophy.[63] Again, it is a matter of interpretation, and even believers in the unicity of substantial form have found support in Augustine.[64] There are clearer cases in Augustine, however, which seem to suggest some composition in the soul.[65] At least in what concerns universal hylemorphism, therefore, it seems that Avicebron (*pace Zavalloni*) is a more direct source for the pluralist view. Augustine

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1894 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 47), 466, 5-21; *De vera religione*, c.18, PL 34, col. 137, n. 36 [ed. Martin 1962 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 50), 209].

[62] Augustine, *De vera religione*, c.18, PL 34, col. 137, n. 36 [ed. Martin 1962 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 50), 209]: Matter is of itself some "thing" independently of form, and to that extent its (matter's) reality also preexists in the divine ideas.

[63] See for example Thomas of York, *Sapientale*, Vat.Lat. 6771, fol. 88d. Cf. Zavalloni 1951 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 43), 443.

[64] In *De immortalitate animae*, c.15, PL 32, col. 1033, n. 24 [ed. Verheijen 1981 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 50)], Augustine states that the whole being of a living body derives from the soul. The unitarians could well have seen there at least a denial of the development of substantial form. To this the pluralists retorted by quoting from Augustine's *Retractationes*, I, c.53, PL 32, col. 591 [ed. A. Mutzenbecher, Turnhout 1984, 16, 28-17, 3], where he withdraws his former statement. William de la Mare, for example, refers to the latter passage in his *Correctorium*, a.31 (Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), 131).

[65] Augustine, *Literal Commentary on Genesis*, VII, c.6, PL 34, col. 359, n. 9 [ed. Zycha 1894 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 47), 206, 1-4]: "Fortasse potuit et anima, antequam ea ipsa natura fieret, quae anima dicitur, cuius vel pulchritudo virtus, vel deformitas vitium est, *habere aliquam materiam pro suo genere spiritualem*". My italics. See also, *Lit. Comm. on Genesis*, VII, c.27, PL 34, col. 369, n. 39 [ed. Zycha, 225, 4-12].

seems to have operated more noticeably over the pluralist thesis in what concerns the notion of matter as a positive entity, rather than regarding the perfectibility of form.

Apart from the notion of a *forma corporeitatis*—which has been already established as of clear Aristotelian origin—, Aristotle equally served for explaining the idea of continuity in change (in favour of the pluralist view), and the relation of the intellectual soul to other forms (used alternatively by pluralist and unitarians).[66] The first idea is closely connected to the doctrine of the embryonic development.[67] The pluralists believed that they were legitimately entitled to appeal to the philosopher's authority insofar as they could show that Aristotle's natural philosophy implied a continuous progress in substantial form, thus suggesting the idea of a gradual completion. In *De generatione animalium*,[68] Aristotle says that "the animal and the man are not made at the same time", but the sensitive soul comes first and is generated from our parents. Following this line, the pluralists contended that the sensitive soul is gradually perfected (to Aquinas this would mean "alteration", not generation proper)[69] in accordance with the temporal development of the embryo. Further on the intellectual soul arrives and constitutes a substantial unity with the sensitive soul, the most perfect form in the natural order. It is a true metaphysical union and not a mere juxtaposition of forms.[70] Aristotle's doctrine of the development of the embryo, however, does not necessarily entail a plurality of forms. Aquinas' theory of the succession of forms can be interpreted as an effort to adapt the principles of hylemorphism to his own formulation of matter and form. Indeed, the thesis of the gradual perfection of substantial form culminating in the intellect shares some aspects with the Aristotelian account of change. However, as will be

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[66] Cf. Zavalloni 1951(*op. cit.*, above, n. 43), 463-8.

[67] See Aristotle, *De generatione animalium*, II, 3, 376a35-b5 (in: *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. J. Barnes, Princeton 1984, vol. 1).

[68] Aristotle, *De generatione animalium*, II.3

[69] See Aquinas, *Quodlibet* I, q.6. This is one occasion on which Knapwell supplies, at least *prima facie*, a more satisfactory argument than that of Aquinas'. See art. 32 of Knapwell's *Correctorium Corruptorii "Quare"* (Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), 143).

[70] William de la Mare adopts this general pluralist argument in his *Correctorium*, in the solution to the question of the embryo. To the objection that *generatio unius est corruptio alterius* (Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione*, I, 4, 17), William maintains that the principle only applies to the simple elements, which cannot coexist among themselves. In the composite, however, there is a hierarchy of forms in virtue of which there is a true essential subordination of the forms, thus guaranteeing the substantial unity of the composite. See Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1): *Correctorium "Quare"* . . ., a.102 ("Quod impossibile est plures formas substantiales esse in eodem"), 395-6.

subsequently seen, the pluralists often overlooked the fact that Aristotle considered the intellect, however ambiguously, as a superior and separate substance created directly by God. To that extent, the doctrine of the intellect does not directly affect the continuity of natural change.

The second of the Aristotelian *loci classici* then, concerns the much-debated doctrine of the intellect. The pre-existence of previous forms in the composite poses the question for the pluralists of the hierarchy of souls. As a response, the pluralists mainly appealed to a passage in Aristotle's *De anima* II, 3,[71] where he explains the relation between the vegetative and sensitive souls using the example of geometrical figures. The sensitive soul is said to contain the vegetative soul as the pentagon completes and perfects the quadrilateral. This image served the pluralists as an argument in support of their thesis of the progressive evolution of substantial form. However, Aristotle never mentions the intellectual soul in these passages, and the comparison with the geometric figures could well have referred to the vegetative and sensitive souls only.

On the other hand, some other texts found in Aristotle could support a unitarian thesis. In what concerns the pure potentiality of matter, a particular passage in *De generatione et corruptione* seems to suggest that prime matter is of itself completely devoid of form.[72] Likewise in the *Metaphysics*, matter is described as lacking all positive characteristics.[73] Furthermore, as the unitarians saw it, it is once such an (Aristotelian) understanding of prime matter and its corresponding relation to substantial form is established, that the plurality of forms becomes a *non sequitur*. If matter is by nature pure potentiality, the soul is necessarily united to the body *as a form*, and is therefore in the whole body and in each of its parts as a unity. Any other way of conceiving the relation between body and soul is not substantial but accidental, such that the composite would be seen as a juxtaposition of parts with no unifying principle.[74] By the same token, the Platonist thesis[75] that man is an aggregate of two complete beings where one moves the other, is a position that could logically entail a plurality of forms without contradiction. For

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[71] Aristotle, *De anima*, II, 3, 414b28-32.

[72] Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione* II, 1 (329a, 24-26): "Our doctrine is that there is a [first] matter [. . .], but it has no separate existence".

[73] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII, 3 (1029a, 20-21): "[. . .] by 'first matter' I mean that which is neither a particular thing, nor of a certain quantity, nor assigned to any other category by which being is determined".

[74] See Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, cc.57 and 58; *ST* Ia, q.76, a.8.

[75] See Plato, *Timaeus*, 69e.

the diverse operations of one and the same being could emerge from different sources while leaving intact the substantial independence of the thing moved. As Aquinas would retort, if the soul were united to the body merely as a mover, we could say that it is not in the body as a whole but only in one part whence it could move the remainder.[76]

Whether or not Aquinas' understanding of Aristotle was "less contaminated" than the pluralists', it seems clear that Aquinas was primarily acting as a natural philosopher when interpreting Aristotle. This is not to say that the pluralists were by contrast acting as theologians, but their connection of Aristotelian physics to an Augustinian view of creation (hence the connection between a *forma corporeitatis* and the *rationes seminales*) certainly contributed to safeguard a continuity with theological dogma. On the other hand, the (metaphysical) disagreement between the two interpretations of hylemorphism resulted in an incommensurability of the unitarian and the pluralist principles. Given their exclusive attribution of actuality to form and its total absence in matter, the supporters of a unitarian view understood the notion of a *forma corporeitatis* as necessarily linked to the existence of a certain type of actuality in matter. However, it is important to note that the belief in some sort of actuality in prime matter, although widespread among the pluralists, did not necessarily imply the positing of a "corporeal form" as equivalent to an "intellectual soul". Unlike the unitarians, the pluralist view does not make actuality and form interchangeable in value. These led to a series of confusions on both parts the consequences of which were acutely revealed in a theological context.

4. *A Theological Problem: The Numerical Identity of Christ's Body*

Perhaps the most crucial of the theological issues regarding the controversy over the unicity of form was the numerical identity of Christ's body living and dead. For, if matter does not offer a disposition of its own, if the body is what it is wholly in virtue of the soul, then, in the separation of body and soul, Christ's death leads to one of two possibilities. Either his dead body ceases to be identified with his living body, or Christ would have had to assume another body in the resurrection. Both tenets were contrary to dogma.

[76] See Aquinas, *ST* Ia, q.76, a.3.

4.1. *Thomas Aquinas on the Numerical Identity of Christ's Body*

In the third book of his *Commentary*,[77] Aquinas' argument about the numerical identity of Christ's body is based on his definition of man as a unity of body and soul (*Videtur quod Christus in illo triduo fuerit homo*). Unlike Hugh of Saint Victor, who identifies human nature wholly with the soul,[78] for Aquinas the separation of body and soul at death signifies a substantial change entailing corruption and not just alteration. Consequently, Christ as a man can be said to be the same living and dead only equivocally.

In the *Quodlibets* the discussion is presented in a more explicit theological sense (*Utrum in Christus in triduo mortis fuerit idem homo numero*).[79] In *Quodlibet* II (1269) Aquinas affirms the identity of the dead and living Christ only as an identity *secundum quid* and not as an identity *simpliciter*. He reasons as follows. In Christ, body and soul are united not only in one person but also in one nature. His divinity, however, is united to the body and soul of Christ in person but not in nature. That is why in the separation of body and soul Christ can still be referred to as *idem numero simpliciter*, that is, in virtue of the hypostatic or personal union. As human nature, on the other hand, there are two ways of understanding the death of Christ. If we consider Christ's death as referring to his humanity as a whole (*quantum ad totam naturam*), there can be no identity between Christ living and dead, given the separation of body and soul. Considering, however, the parts that compose his humanity, his soul can be said to be the same because the substantial form itself does not suffer changes, and it is to the substantial form that the person of Christ is united. His body, on the other hand, is the same not *simpliciter* but *secundum quid*, that is, according to matter. Aquinas is very careful not to attribute any kind of actuality to the remaining matter after the body's death.[80] However, Aquinas often resorts to the category of quantity in order to supply a guarantee of continuity in change, given the impossibility of a *forma corporeitatis*. As in the question of transubstantiation, the accidents of

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[77] Aquinas, *Sentences* III, dist. 22, q.1, a.1.

[78] See Hugh of St Victor, *De Sacramentis*, Book II, part 1, chapters IX and XI (ed. Migne, PL 176, 393D-399B, 401B-411D).

[79] Aquinas, *Quodlibet* II, q.1, a.1.

[80] The remaining matter could perhaps be here understood as *quantitas*, the three-dimensionality of which would permit us to refer to it as a body, but where strictly speaking there is no individual composite *(hoc aliquid)* anymore. However, there is no evidence that Aquinas actually puts it in those terms.

the bread that our senses still perceive after it has become the body of Christ inhere in dimensive quantity as their subject.[81]

The unicity of form thesis, Aquinas believes, is capable of offering a satisfactory account of change. However, there is some difficulty in explaining continuity from the corruption of one form to the generation of another, thus appearing as if every change entailed transubstantiation. The pluralists have the opposite problem, where what remains after change always has some kind of actuality and the simple advent of a superior form determining the previous ones sounds more like mere alteration than a true generative process.

In *Quodlibet* III.2, a.2 (Easter 1270), *Utrum oculus Christi post mortem fuerit oculus aequivoce*, Aquinas applies the same principle to individual parts of the body. If the body of Christ as man is the same only equivocally, then his eyes and any other part of his body which suffered substantial change after separation from the soul are thereby the same only equivocally. The grounds of this argument are found in the *Summa Theologiae*, q.76, a.8: "Whether the whole soul is in each part of the body". According to Aquinas, the relation of the soul to the whole of the body is not the same as its relation to the parts. For the soul is related to the whole primarily and essentially as to its object, whereas its relation to the parts is secondary inasmuch as they are ordained to the whole. Consequently, just as the soul bears the form and identity of the body, in like manner the parts of the body, inasmuch as they participate in the body as a whole, are substantially affected by the soul's departure.

In *Quodlibet* IV.5 (Easter 1271) there appears to be a change in Aquinas' stance,[82] or at least in the way in which he expressed his view. In response to the question *Utrum corpus Christi in cruce et in sepulcro sit unum numero*, the

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[81] By "dimensive quantity" it is meant the three-dimensionality which material bodies possess on account of their being affected by the accident of quantity. Material bodies are "extense" because they are seen under the category of quantity. In the Eucharist, however, Aquinas holds that Christ's body is under the accident of quantity without being affected by it, that is, *per modum substantiae*. (*ST* IIIa, q.76, a.1.) It is ultimately dimensive quantity, therefore, which accounts for Christ's real presence in the sacrament. For Aquinas' account of transubstantiation and his account of the "real presence" of Christ in the Eucharist, see *ST* IIIa, qq.75-77. Cf. A. Kenny, *The Use of Logical Analysis in Theology*, in: A. Kenny (ed.), *Reason and Religion: Essays in Philosophical Theology*, Oxford 1987, 3-20. For the problems Aquinas' account of the real presence entailed for Aristotelian philosophy, see E. Sylla, E. (1975), *Autonomous and Handmaiden Science. St Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham in the Eucharist*, in: J.E. Murdoch and E. Sylla (eds.), *The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning*, Dordrecht-Boston 1975, 349-96.

[82] Cf. Zavalloni 1951 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 43), 267-8.

solution given is *est idem numero corpus Christi appensum in cruce et iacens in sepulcro*. There is, then, a stronger stress on the identity between the dead body of Christ and his body when living. Aquinas' argument no longer rests on metaphysical considerations of the composite nature and on the definition of a human being, but on purely Christological reasons. In trying to avoid Arianism (whereby the Word in Christ takes the place of the human soul—so that the hypostatic union is consequently dissolved at death)[83] it is necessary to state the identity *secundum suppositum*[84] (that is, according to the divine person, the Son) of Christ living and dead. On the other hand, there is the risk of the Gaianite[85] heresy, which contends that Christ's body is incorruptible because his divinity is united to him in nature and not only in person—in which case we must differentiate his body living and dead. Aquinas concludes in favour of the identity between the crucified Christ and the dead Christ, because *prima unitas maior est quam secunda differentia*.

Aquinas does not resort in this last passage as he had done in his last two *Quodlibets* to a difference between Christ as the Son of God and Christ as a man. Perhaps the condemnation of 10 December 1270 and the opposition of the Paris masters[86] to the unicity theory influenced the

[83] Distinctive of Arianism (from Arius, d.336) is a denial of the full divinity of Christ, holding that he was not God by nature, but a creature. Consequently, rather than stating that the Son assumes a human *nature*, Arianism identifies the divine person of Christ with his human *soul*.

[84] The term *suppositum* comes from the Greek ὑπόστασις, which means literally "substance". In christological and trinitarian discussions, however, the term "substance" usually signifies the divine esence or nature, as opposed to the three persons, which are more commonly qualified as *supposita* in the sense of a substantial individual reality. It was mainly under the influence of the Cappadocian Fathers that the terminology was clarified and standardized, so that the accepted formula for the Trinity became "Three Hypostases in one Ousia". Likewise in Christology, Christ is the union of two natures (οὐσία), human and divine, and one *suppositum*, that is, the Son as the second person of the Trinity. The hypostatic union refers therefore to a personal or "suppositаl" union whereby the person of the Son assumes a human nature. Accordingly, an identity *secundum suppositum* of Christ's body living and dead, is an identity not according to Christ's human nature (for this one disappears at the separation of body and soul), but according to his divine person, who indeed withstands the bodily death.

[85] Gaianites: monophysite sect at the beginnings of the V century. The name is derived from Gaianos, who first developed the doctrine of the incorruptibility of Christ's body.

[86] Tempier condemned thirteen propositions on 10 December 1270, all more or less related to a "radical" or Averroist interpretation of Aristotle. There is a letter (c. 1273-1276) written by Giles of Lessines to Albert the Great containing a list of fifteen errors which were being taught by leading masters of the arts faculty at that time, thirteen of which coinciding exactly with Tempier's condemned propositions. The additional propositions listed by Giles were defended by Aquinas. Prop. 14 is based on Aquinas' *Quodlibets*

theological tenor of *Quodlibet* IV. If this is certain, however, then it is only a parenthesis in the course of Aquinas' line of argument, since we see him going back shortly afterwards (around 1272-1273) to his earlier distinction of the divine and human natures in Christ in the third part of the *Summa Theologiae*. In questions 25 and 50, the identity of Christ the man is understood as existing only *secundum quid*—that is, according to his soul. And although aware (as seen at the beginning of q.50, a.4) that Christ's death is an article of faith, Aquinas nevertheless maintains that Christ's identity can be said to exist *simpliciter* only regarding the hypostatic union.[87]

Although the debate over the unicity of form adopts a theological character, Aquinas' doctrine follows a sustained metaphysical line which puts forward such neatly determined principles that there is little for his followers to add. Accordingly, subsequent works on this issue seem to provide little more than circumstantial elaboration.

4.2. *William de la Mare and the Pluralists' Corrective*

William de la Mare, the "accuser" in Knapwell's Lament,[88] can be seen as one of the first links between the doctrinal interventions of Kilwardby and Pecham. His corrective inaugurates the philosophical debates later developed by masters such as Richard of Middleton, Peter John Olivi, and most significantly, Duns Scotus. William's *Correctorium fratris Thomae* (c. 1278)[89] is the result of an examination of a number of

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II, III and IV, and reads "Quod corpus Christi jacens in sepulcro et positum in cruce non est, vel non idem fuit idem semper, sed secundum quid". As for the other proposition, 15, it concerned the simplicity of angelic substances: "Quod angelus et anima sunt simplices, non absoluta simplicitate nec per accessum ad compositionem, sed tantum per recessum a summo simplici". If these propositions were not originally targeted for condemnation, it is at least very significant that they were included in Giles' list. For the list and Albert's response to Giles' letter, see F. Van Steenberghen, *Le "De quindecim problematibus" d'Albert le Grand*, in: L. Noël e.a. (Eds.), *Mélanges A. Pelzer*, Louvain 1947, 415-39.

[87] Aquinas, *ST* III, q.50, a.5, ad 1 seems to want to fill the hiatus between *Quodlibets* III and IV resorting to the difference between the body of Christ and the body of ordinary men.

[88] Knapwell begins his defence of Aquinas in the *Correctorium corruptorii 'Quare'* by quoting Job, 6, 25-31 (ed. Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), 5): "Quare detraxistis sermonibus veritatis cum e vobis nullus sit qui possit arguere me? Ad increpandum tantum eloquia concinatis, et subvertere nitimini amicum vestrum. Respondete, obsecro, absque contentione, et non invenietis in lingua mea iniquitatem, nec in faucibus meis stultitia personabit".

[89] William's *Correctorium* should not be confused with the abbreviated work *Declarationes*.

Aquinas' works and the extraction therefrom of 118 objectionable propositions deemed "erroneous" or "pernicious" from the standpoint of orthodox Christian dogma. Thirteen of those propositions were condemned by Tempier in 1277—a fact which William is only too quick to point out in order to strengthen his case. In its second, and standard, version, dating from around 1278, the text assumed some of the character of an official document after its adoption by the Franciscan General Chapter in Strasbourg in 1282.[90] William's *Correctorium* thus came to be a qualifying statement of Aquinas' texts and the Franciscan Order's official view of them.

The standard version of the Franciscan *Correctorium* is transmitted in its entirety by Richard Knapwell's *Correctorium "Quare"*, in which William de la Mare's arguments are incorporated and followed by a counter-reply from Knapwell. As a methodical criticism of Aquinas' arguments, William's arguments are, by necessity, driven to operate at a metaphysical level. And although he is keener in refuting the unicity theory than in constructing a positive pluralist doctrine, we can still perceive in William's arguments common elements of pluralist presuppositions.

Thus, on the one hand, William maintains that prime matter is conceived as an entity possessing some actuality, if very imperfect; on the other hand, that substantial form is seen as the determining principle in the sense of creating disposition for further determination.[91] Just as the pentagon contains the quadrilateral in potency, the rational soul presupposes the sensitive soul as an incomplete being. However, the vegetative and the sensitive souls are not of the same species as the intellectual soul. They are, on the contrary, three different essences bearing among them an essential relation. The intellectual soul does not give the composite its whole being (*non dat illud esse totum*), but it completes and perfects the being given by the preceding forms.[92] Indeed, the vegetative, sensitive and

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The latter consists of a rejection of sixty propositions by Aquinas, thirty-two of which are found in Tempier's condemnation. The *Declarationes* was mistakenly attributed to William (see F. Pelster, *Declarationes Magistri Guilelmi de la Mare O.F.M. de variis sententiis S. Thomae Aquinatis*, Münster 1956).

[90] "Item minister generalis imponit ministris provincialibus, quod non permittant multiplicari "Summam" fratris Thomae nisi apud lectores rationabiliter intelligentes, et hoc nonnisi cum declarationibus fratris Wilhelmi de Mara, non in marginibus positis sed in quaternis; et huiusmodi declarationes non scribantur per aliquem secularem". Quoted from F. Ehrle, *Der Kampf um die Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin in den ersten fünfzig Jahren nach seinem Tode*, in: Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, 37 (1913), 266-318.

[91] Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1): *Correctorium "Quare"*, art. 31: 134.

[92] Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), 134.

intellectual souls constitute three forms which are nonetheless related in degrees of potentiality, and in that way they converge towards the essential unity of being. The rational soul is the actualising and completing form, whereas the other two are incomplete and account for the potentiality of the body. Thus, in man there is not so much one substantial form but rather one soul which comprehends many (*quod plures concedunt*).[93]

To the standard unitarian objection that in a plurality of forms any power of the soul which is in act would not necessarily impede the operation of another power, William responds that there is in fact an essential connection between soul and body which would impede the simultaneity of operations. Their connection is not on account of an essential single source, but by reason of their mutual relation as perfection and perfectible.[94] Each form does not imply an actuality, although there is a certain degree of perfection in every one of them. This is reflected in the modes of predication[95] where "man is an animal" is understood as a substantial predication and not merely a predication *per accidens*. "Animal" is part of the definition of the subject "man", and thus meets the conditions of substantial predication, just as more imperfect forms refer to the rational soul as their *suppositum*. This, furthermore, reveals how the pluralists, unlike the advocates of the unicity thesis, did not necessarily identify actuality with form. The presence of many forms in a composite does not have to entail a plurality of *supposita* or individual beings. There is a subordination of imperfect forms in respect to the most perfect form, which alone responds for the creature's specific nature.

On the specific issue of Christ's identity, William's main objections regard Aquinas' view as shown in his *Summa Theologiae*[96] and in his II, III and IV *Quodlibets*. As was seen, in both instances Aquinas tries to defend the identity of the living and dead body of Christ by appealing to the hypostatic union. All that remains after the death of created substances is matter, which is not sufficient to guarantee the identity between

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[93] Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), 132. Again, for a very lucid account of the introduction of a notion of a "corporeal form" (or in that case some sort of "form" previous to the substantial form), see Hyman's article 1965 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 42), 385-406.

[94] Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), 134.

[95] Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), 133. As Aquinas saw it, if there is more than one substantial form in the composite, they must necessarily relate as act does to portentiality. Otherwise, the conditions for substantial predication, which must manifest the unity of the subject, cannot be met. See Aquinas, *ST* Ia, q.118, a.2.

[96] Particularly Aquinas, *ST* Ia, q.50, a.5.

the living and the dead body. When Christ dies, however, not only prime matter but also the divine *suppositum* remains the same. The hypostatic union thus constitutes the grounds for arguing in favour of the numerical identity of Christ's body.

William's understanding of Aquinas' view was *Quod corpus Christi mortuum in triduo quoad aliquid non fuit idem quod prius*.[97] It is interesting that William should include the term *aliquid* in the phrasing of Aquinas' proposition. For it is a legitimate objection for anyone to ask that, if prime matter can survive the body's death, then why is it not prime matter the real substance?[98] However, the objection itself already presupposes in prime matter some kind of actuality susceptible to being a particular thing of its own right. Aquinas denies that prime matter could be considered as a *hoc aliquid* in the sense of being some individual thing we could point to. Matter does not have any actuality *per se*, but is called a being only in terms of its potentiality to the substantial form. By the same token (a pluralist would gather) Christ's dead body would not correspond to the same *hoc aliquid* that was living. Pluralists, in fact, would like to think that Christ's body preserves its numerical identity *simpliciter*, that is, by reason of the metaphysical nature of the body itself and not only on account of the divine *suppositum*. According to Aquinas, if we are referring to the human Christ, we cannot ignore that "being animated" constitutes a substantial difference in man and that, conversely, "being unanimated" entails true corruption. The body of the composite gets its being from a single substantial form, so that the dead body would be another form, the form of a cadaver. We are not dealing then with the same body—at least not *simpliciter*. Consequently, regarding Christ's human nature as a totality, that is, as the union of body and soul, we cannot but speak of an identity *secundum quid* (that is, according to the divine *suppositum*).

William responds to this based on a particular notion of the human body.[99] Christ's dead body is the same body *simpliciter* as the living body was, not only on account of the hypostatic union but also due to the union and identity of the substantial form and the body *in quantum corpus*. To be animated is not a substantial difference of the body as body, but of the body as a living thing. Corruption, then, is a substantial change that happens to the *life* of the body, not to its intrinsic nature, which is

[97] Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), *Correctorium "Quare"*, a.107: 407.
[98] Cf. M. McCord Adams, *William Ockham*, 2 vols, Notre Dame, Ind. 1987, vol. 2, 637.
[99] Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), *Correctorium "Quare"*: 407.

independent from the soul. The form by which a body is a body is different from that by which it is animated. Referring explicitly to the terminology of Porphyry (*privatio, habitus, differentia, divisio*),[100] William contends that if we take "inanimatum" in a privative sense, we can speak of Christ's body as having numerical identity. For if privation does not entail a constitutive difference for the body (that is, a difference that would produce a substantial definition) nor does it divide it so that it would become two bodies.[101] Likewise, being unanimated can follow animation in Christ's body. *Et catholice est tenendum quod non secundum quid fuit idem sed simpliciter quia eadem habuit materiam et formam substantialem scilicet corporalem.*[102] The differentiation between "being" and "life" here understood could constitute a very strong pluralist argument. For if we grant, with the unitarians, that being is altogether conferred by a sole substantial form, then there is no question about the non-identity of the body living and dead. If we consider life as a *property* entailed by being itself, however, we could argue in favour of a continuity of the body where its being dead would not signify a substantial change but a privation of some quality. As will be seen, even a rigorous unitarian as Giles of Lessines would accept the validity and truth of this argument.

4.3. *Knapwell's Reply*

The Dominican reaction to the censures against Aquinas was initially manifested in two ways: by treatises concentrating on the problem of the unicity of form,[103] and by the sarcastically entitled *Correctoria corruptorii*,[104] that is, works composed in answer to William de la Mare's crit-

[100] Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), .408. For Porphyry, see *Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium*, ed. A. Busse, Berlin 1887.

[101] One of the pluralist principles that the unitarians explicitly deny is that privation can be identified to an *inchoatio formae*. To the unitarians privation cannot signify a form, however imperfect, because it does not bear any actuality.

[102] Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), *Correctorium "Quare"*: 407.

[103] For example, *Tractatus de formis*, under the name of Herveus Natalis; *Contra pluralitatem formarum*, by Thomas Sutton (ed. P. Mandonnet, in: *S. Thomae Aquinatis Opuscula omnia*, 5 vols, Paris 1927, V, 308-46); *Contra gradus*, Giles of Rome; *De unitate formae*, Giles of Lessines (ed. M. De Wulf 1901) (*op. cit.*, above, n. 52). Although we find manifestations of this type in Dominicans at Oxford, they were a more typical result of the Paris condemnation of 1277.

[104] Although we find Parisian polemical monographs against William de la Mare's treatise, it was primarily at Oxford that the reaction adopted this shape. We know of three Oxford *Correctoria corruptorii*, which appeared between the years 1279 and 1284, each

icisms of Aquinas' teaching. These twin lines of defence were closely connected, as we can see from passages in Knapwell's *Correctorium "Quare"*,[105] where he borrows extensively from Thomas Sutton's *Contra pluralitatem formarum*[106] in his account of the introduction of substantial form in matter.[107] In a "first phase",[108] ranging more or less between the 1277 condemnation and Knapwell's excommunication by Pecham in 1286, earlier Oxonians such as Knapwell had no share in broader intellectual questions that developed later. They seemed to be driven by loyalty rather than by abstract enquiry, and were no less incited by authoritarian discouragement. Hence the defensive character of Knapwell's *Quare* and its rather *ad hoc* replies. However, for all its limitations, this kind of work does provide an approximate idea of the polemical character of the times.

We know very little about Knapwell's life before the controversy, and in fact the turning points of his career seem to have been marked rather

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being identified by the opening word, namely "Quare", "Sciendum" and "Questione". For the authorship of "Quare" see below n. 105. For the authorship of "Sciendum" see Ehrle 1913, (*op. cit.*, above, n. 90), 37; Glorieux 1947 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 3); Mandonnet 1913 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 3); and Roensch 1964 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 2). Ehrle leaves the possibility open for it being Durandellus, and refers to it as the "ruhigere Correctorium corruptorii" due to its rather carefree and unforced response. Glorieux presents the hypothesis of William Macclesfield, whereas Mandonnet seems comfortable with the possibility of Hugues de Billom, in Paris. Roensch is certain it is Orford's work. The incomplete "Questione" is less straight forward and its exact date is not known. Ehrle simply leaves it as "das Correctorium des Anonymus des Merton MS 276". Glorieux forwards the uncertain possibility of Hugues of Billom. According to Mandonnet the author could be Robert of Hereford, another English Dominican who composed around the same time a defence of Aquinas against Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome. Roensch takes the author as being William Macclesfield.

[105] There has been much discussion about the authorship of the Correctorium "Quare". Ehrle calls it rather sceptically "das dem Aegidius de Roma zugeschriebene Correctorium . . ." and affirms that in fact the author is most likely to be a Dominican. Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1) discards possible contenders such as Giles of Rome, John of Paris, Hughes of Billom, and Durandellus and arrives to the conclusion that we are dealing here with an English Dominican. Further resemblance between "Quare" and passages condemned by Pecham leads him to assert that the author is Knapwell (Roensch follows this opinion in 1964). Later on, in his revision of 1947 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 3), Glorieux confirms his former conclusion and the explicit references in "Quare" to Sutton's *Contra pluralitatem formarum*. Mandonnet seems to take it, too, as being Knapwell's work. This is the view adopted here. For the purposes of the present paper it is enough that it can be attributed to an English Dominican.

[106] Thomas Sutton, *Contra pluralitatem formarum*, ed. Mandonnet 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 103).

[107] *Correctorium "Quare"*, art. 32. See also art. 85, where there is an analogous utilisation of Sutton's treatise.

[108] For further detail on the "two phases" of the "Oxford movement" and a thourough elaboration of the other masters, see Kelley 1977 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 2).

by academic conflict and authoritarian interventions. From his *Quaestio Disputata De Unitate Formae*,[109] in which he "determines" the orthodoxy of the unicity of form thesis, we can infer that he probably incepted around 1284, that is, after writing his response to William de la Mare. We also know that Knapwell experienced a change in his intellectual outlook from his early days at Oxford, when he was still inquiring openly on metaphysical matters, to his later work, largely apologetic. In *Quare* Knapwell himself declares having evolved in this manner: *Et ecce coram Deo quia non mentior, si scirem argumenta quae hoc* [the unicity of form] *ostendunt dissolvere ut quandoque credebam, responsionem per singula posuissem.*[110]

Well aware of the pluralists' theological worries, Knapwell's main point as seen in his reply to William's *Correctorium,* is to establish the theological neutrality of the unicity of form thesis. As the opening paragraph to his reply in article 31 says: *Nostrum autem in proposito erit ostendere quod nullum inconveniens vel haeresis sequitur ex illa [circa unitatem] positione, et quod isti* [William *et alii*] *per suas responsiones, argumenta fratris Thomae non evadunt.*[111] In this spirit, Knapwell refutes William's corrective and establishes that the gradual perfection and completion of the forms in the composite until the final substance does not imply true generation. The following argument[112] constitutes, perhaps, Knapwell's most comprehensive statement of principles, gathering together the main unitarian premises. The final substantial form, he says, does not confer a *maius perfecta* existence to the previous one, for there cannot be "more and "less" in the same genus. It is a different substantial form altogether, perfect in itself, and the principle of *all* existence and perfection. Consequently, where there is more than one form, there are in fact two beings,[113] which is impossible. Being (*esse*) is the actuality itself of a thing, so that every complete being distinguishes itself from all others. It is therefore contradictory for two fully actualised beings to constitute one essence. For no other form gives being substantially except the substantial form. And if we came upon (*inveniatur*) some substantial form that is not actual in this way, such a form would participate very little, or not at all, in the principle of perfection—so that when finally the act of subsistence arrives, that form would not be substantial but accidental. In that case, the final form would be introduced

[109] Edited by F.E. Kelley, *Richard Knapwell. Quaestio disputata de unitate formae*, Paris 1982.
[110] Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), 206.
[111] Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), 135.
[112] Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), 142-3.
[113] Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), 143.

as actualising an imperfect form, and the subsequent change would be alteration rather than true generation.

Following the same tone of his opening paragraph, Knapwell closes the argument with conciliatory words: *Unde quidquid sit de veritate in hac parte, impossibile est omnino, per modum quo isti ponunt, pluralitatem formarum substantialium in eodem sustinere. Ergo modus alius, si quidem possibile est, inveniatur; quo invento nihil amplius erroris in fide vel philosophia ex positione quae ponit unitatem formae concludi poterit.*[114] It is significant that Knapwell should allow so much flexibility to rational argumentation (*modus alius, si quidem possibile est, inveniatur*) in order to meet a desired metaphysical conclusion. Whether this attitude was really driven by a (partisan, perhaps) motivation to preserve the "integrity" of the unicity thesis is not certain. In any case, the circumstances in which Knapwell wrote this reply, and its apologetic tone, seem to suggest that it was more a matter of loyal sentiment than a true understanding of Aquinas' doctrine.

In article 31,[115] Knapwell borrows his argument from Aquinas when he (Knapwell) starts by differentiating two ways of understanding *simpliciter* for the identity of Christ's body living and dead. Christ is the same *simpliciter* only in terms of the hypostatic union. That is, Christ is the same "absolutely" because no other body has been added. Christ is not the same *simpliciter*, however, if we refer to the composite of body and soul that is his humanity (for the presence or absence of soul indeed implies a substantial change). Knapwell is very careful not to suggest relativity by explicitly using the *secundum quid*. Instead, he cunningly adds that to say that Christ suffered change after death is heretical. Although the body suffers change with death, this does not imply that Christ assumes a new nature, for mainly two reasons. On the one hand, what remains at death (i.e. the cadaver) is not assumable *per se*, for if it has no form it cannot be qualified as a (human) nature. On the other hand, the human nature assumed by Christ, although transformed by death, rises again in virtue of the unscathed hypostatic union, just as wine, Knapwell adds (in not the most suitable illustration), turns into vinegar without a new liquid being poured in. Thus Christ's body was one and the same body living and dead on account of the divine *suppositum*. We must not infer from this that Christ incarnated again, even if his body is said to have adopted a substantial form in life and another one at death (*licet corpus*

[114] Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), 143.
[115] Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), 135.

illud benedictum in vita et in morte formam substantialem aliam et aliam dicatur habere).[116]

In other words, Christ's body, as a body, is the same only *secundum quid*. Again in article 107[117] (*Quod corpus Christi in triduo quoad aliquid non fuit idem quod prius*), Knapwell makes a similar paraphrase of the *secundum quid*. William de la Mare's objection had appealed to a logical difference between being "animated" and "unanimated", in a way that death does not entail any change for the body *in quantum corpus* but is to be understood only as a "privation" of life. In his reply, Knapwell is quick to reprove William's argument as *contra philosophiam et contra omnem, ut creditur, veritatem*—perhaps too quick considering that the problem of substantial form was believed by other unitarians to be a metaphysical one and thus not necessarily a threat to the integrity of any truth beyond it. According to Knapwell's reasoning, the conception that a change in the substantial form is a matter of *privatio* is a complete fiction. Whereas states of habit or privation are categories that refer to accidents and hence can be referred to the same subject, being unanimated has to do with the substance and therefore entails a change in the subject's very identity. To be "unanimated" can be seen as a privation only from the standpoint of primary matter, which is pure potentiality. Therefore, in other words, Christ's body, as being part of a composite, cannot preserve its identity after death.

Knapwell's intention to reconcile the plurality and the unicity theses on the grounds of theological neutrality is made explicit in his later disputed question *De Unitate Formae*. There, Knapwell's main concern is to show that the unicity of form does not prevent some degree of numerical identity existing in the substance before and after corruption. As a statement of the main difficulty entailed by the unicity doctrine, the disputed question ran as follows: *Utrum secundum fidem de essentia humanae naturae verbo oporteat ponere plures formas*. Delivered some time in 1285 (and certainly after Pecham's 1284 condemnation), Knapwell did, then, make a public stand of determining that the unicity of form was a safe thesis to uphold as far as faith and reason are concerned. There is indeed a note of moderation and a search for an agreement: "it is of chief importance, therefore, to consider those aspects on which one and the other position necessarily agree".[118]

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[116] Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), 136.
[117] Glorieux 1927 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), 408.
[118] Quoted from Kelley (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), 138.

However, Knapwell's attempts to bring reconciliation between the pluralist and unitarian standpoints backfired, thus provoking an unfavourable reaction on the part of the authorities. In a letter dated 1 June 1285 and addressed to the bishop of Lincoln,[119] Pecham mentions a sarcastic pamphlet written against himself, which he believed to have come from Knapwell. This incriminating booklet, together with the former disputed question, was Pecham's direct target in the 1286 excommunication and it marked the end of Knapwell's career. At the urging of William Hothum, his provincial superior, Knapwell refused to accept Pecham's actions as having any validity on canonical grounds and travelled to Rome in order to appeal his case. On the way he stopped in Paris and discussed the situation with Godfrey of Fontaines. Godfrey's *Quodlibet* III testifies to his reaction. In such questions, Godfrey argues, "one need not heed the authority of the Pope or the Fathers of the Church *or any other master*. The only correct guides are the Holy Writ or rational argument".[120] Godfrey regarded Pecham to have exceeded his authority, and his action to have been *mirum*, and *grande periculum*.[121]

Although the legal interpretation that Pecham gave to Kilwardby's prohibition was more openly hostile, Pecham was certainly following the spirit of his predecessor. The action taken in 1277 was not supposed to be tantamount to eradicating heresy. It was rather a veto for teaching certain doctrines "in the schools", either because they were deemed to be philosophically false, or because they could entail opposition to theological dogma. Like Pecham, Kilwardby also received his own call for moderation in the figure of the Dominican Peter of Conflans, at that time Archbishop of Corinth. In a letter to Kilwardby, Conflans discusses the reasons for the prohibition. He examines diverse theses on natural philosophy, subscribing to some and thus criticising Kilwardby's disapproval. The archbishop of Canterbury, in his turn, replied with a *pièce justificative*[122] explaining the motives that incited him to intervene. In 1278[123]

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[119] *Registrum epistolarum fratris Johannis Pecham*, ed. C.T. Martin, 3 vols, London 1885, III, 862.

[120] *Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines*, ed. M. De Wulf – A. Pelzer, Louvain 1904, 2, p. 198.

[121] Ed. De Wulf-Pelzer 1904 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 120), 207-8.

[122] Cf. Robert Kilwardby, *Littera ad Petrum de Confleto*, ed. F. Ehrle in: *Beiträge zur Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Scholastik*, II: *Der Augustinismus und der Aristotelismus*, in: Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters, 5 (1889), 603-35. The letter from Peter of Conflans to Kilwardby is not extant.

[123] Although Giles of Lessines directs his objections to the "archbishop of Canterbury" and in 1278 Pecham had already been appointed, it is still believed that the person

Giles of Lessines, a Dominican master in Paris, wrote a treatise against Kilwardby based on the latter's letter to Conflans. This treatise came to be known as the *De Unitate formae*.[124]

4.4. *The Intervention of Giles of Lessines*

It was to Kilwardby's formulation of the unicity doctrine that Giles of Lessines reacted. Although Giles of Lessines was predominantly in Paris, the way he treats the issue in his treatise *De unitate formae* and the fact that he writes explicitly against Kilwardby, rather make him a witness of the situation at Oxford. However, his intervention is prompted by a different turmoil than that of Knapwell's and the other Oxford masters. The "defensive" literature written in support of Aquinas as a particular product of William de la Mare's declaration had not yet taken place as the characteristic agent which bound Oxford Dominicans together. By the time Giles was writing his treatise, radical Aristotelian masters such as Siger of Brabant were at the peak of their influence, and internal disputes between secular theologians and the mendicant orders had just started. It is in this atmosphere that Giles decided to devote himself to a strict elaboration of Aquinas' thesis of the unicity of substantial form.

The influence that Kilwardby exercised on the Franciscan Pecham tends to make us overlook the fact that Kilwardby was in fact a Dominican. If it was a matter of "Order rivalries", we might well ask ourselves why he did not exercise more (episcopal) ascendancy amongst his brothers. It would be too easy to say that Kilwardby's philosophical point of view was an "out-dated" one from the middle of the century and that it remained isolated for lack of touch with Aquinas' innovations. In fact, Kilwardby's influence at the time of the 1277 ban did provoke a whole campaign against the Thomistic doctrines, translated into works and treatises where those theses were clearly attacked. It was not until the general Chapter in Milan in 1278 that some change was brought about. In that year, two Dominican brothers, provided with full powers, were sent to Oxford to enforce Aquinas' doctrine.[125] By 1279, at the General

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refered to in his treatise is Kilwardby. Giles wrote in the years of 1277 (years of turmoil when Tempier and Kilwardby were the protagonists) and Pecham did not actually assume his office until 1279. Before that, he was in Rome. Cf. De Wulf 1901 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 52), 81.

[124] Ed. De Wulf 1901 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 52).

[125] See *Acta Capitulorum Generalium Ord. Fr. Praed.*, ed. B.M. Reichert, vol. 1, Rome-Stuttgart 1898, 199.

Chapter in Paris,[126] there was no mention of any specific hostility against Aquinas and an expansion of the Thomistic theses against all opposition was advised.

Kilwardby subscribes to the common pluralist view and maintains that each form determines matter in an incomplete way, and that it is the functional convergence of all forms through a dispositive subordination that guarantees the unity of substantial form in the composite. Thus, Kilwardby holds the essential independence among the determining principles, where the intrinsic nature of the inferior form is not involved in the perfection of the superior.[127] On the other hand, the diverse origins of the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellectual souls proves that man is indeed composed of three substantial forms.[128] The first two are a product of natural operation, whereas the intellectual soul is created by God. To the objection that two realities in act cannot constitute one single being, Kilwardby responds that the vegetative and sensitive souls are not completely in act and that it is finally the intellectual soul that perfects matter. In other words, and despite Kilwardby's ambiguous terminology, the soul is composed of three essences meaning by these three incomplete substances.[129]

Kilwardby's concern to eradicate the unicity theory is clear in several propositions contained in the 1277 Oxford prohibition:

2)[130] That the previous forms completely disappear at the advent of the superior form (*Item quod forma corrumpitur in pure nihil*).[131]

3) That there is no actuality whatsoever in matter (*Item quod nulla potentia activa est in materia*).

12) That the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellectual souls constitute one simple form (*Item quod vegetativa, sensitiva et intellectiva sint una forma simplex*).

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[126] See Reichert 1898 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 125), 204.

[127] De Wulf 1901 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 52), 93.

[128] De Wulf 1901 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 52), 92.

[129] *Chartularium*, I, p. 277.

[130] The numbering of Kilwardby's banned propositions adopted in the present paper corresponds to the *Chartularium*. De Wulf uses the same numbering in his *Le traité* (*op. cit.*, above, n. 52).

[131] That is, if the forms that precede the final substantial form disappear completely (*corrumpitur in pure nihil*), what is then left is one and only principle of being: the intellectual soul. In the question of the evolution of the embryo, for example, a unitarian would not accept that the previous vegetative and sensitive souls can coexist with the final intellectual soul. The other forms have to disappear, they cannot survive the advent of the final form as less perfect principles.

13) That the body living and dead is the same body only equivocally. Moreover, that the dead body, as a body, is the same as the living body only *secundum quid* (*Item quod corpus vivum et mortuum est equivoce corpus, et corpus mortuum secundum quod corpus mortuum sit corpus secundum quid*).[132]

In response to Kilwardby's position, Giles is first of all concerned in giving a true assessment of Aquinas' metaphysical terminology in order to clarify all possible ambiguities. *Potentia*, Giles explains, has two very distinct senses in Aquinas' thought.[133] It can be understood as the opposite of *actus*, and as such it signifies receptivity—in this sense it is the aptitude in a subject to be determined through change. It can also mean a proximate principle of the substance's activity—in this sense it belongs to the Aristotelian category of quality. It is the latter meaning, Giles believes, which brought so much ambiguity in defining the presence of the elements in the composite. For the pluralists it was inconceivable that the elements should disappear once the composite was completed by the final substantial form. In order to give a coherent account of the physical changes within the body and to maintain a clear distinction between the spiritual species of the soul and the material body, the elements had to be potentially present in the final composite. The superior substantial form is a mediated perfection of previous forms that still function potentially. Aquinas, on the other hand, cannot accept the coexistence of a plurality of forms in act. The elements remain potentially in the composite once the intellectual form arrives, but this "potentially" does not mean "less perfect" or "incomplete". The *quality* of the elements is always present in the composite, and this is not to say that the substantial form (soul) adopts a material quality, but that it is capable of performing the functions of the previous forms once these have disappeared *as forms*. Thus the elements are in the composite "potentially", that is, in quality.

After giving a brief exposition of the general notions of matter and form as viewed from a unitarian standpoint, Giles deals with the question of the numerical identity of Christ's body. Giles' approach to this question proceeds[134] through a distinction between matter as the generic concept of the living and sensitive substance, and form as the specific concept of the rational being. Although the general Christological conclusion attained by Giles coincides with Aquinas', Giles' argumentation

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[132] *Chartularium*, I, 559.
[133] De Wulf 1901 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 52), 79, c. IV.
[134] De Wulf 1901 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 52), 85.

is still driven by an original approach. Aquinas' account was determined[135] by two ways of considering Christ's body—either in respect to the human nature or in respect to the divine *suppositum*. In the first case it was necessary to conclude that Christ's dead body was the same only *secundum quid*, by virtue of the separation of the soul as the substantial form. In the second sense, Christ retained his numerical identity by reason of the hypostatic union. Giles, too, poses two different ways of considering Christ's body, but his is a more logical than purely Christological consideration.[136] Christ can be seen as the subject of death (that is, from the standpoint of matter) or as an individual (from the standpoint of the substantial form). In the first instance, as a subject his body suffered privation in its separation from the soul. Habits and privations, however, as Aristotle taught, are predicated of the same subject. Therefore, Christ's dead body is the same as the body that was the subject of life, the lack of which signifies the loss of an important quality of being but not the loss of being itself. *Et hoc modo loquuntur omnes, et vere tamen, quod illud corpus Christi, quod pependit in cruce, iacuit in sepulcro et fuerat in utero virginis [idem numero fuit]*.[137] Interestingly enough, William de la Mare, following Porphyryan terminology, arrives at the same conclusion.

In the second instance, as an individual, the form of Christ's dead body is not the soul any more. For an individual to be so, it has to be constituted of matter and form, the latter of which conferring its whole being and individuality. Thus the bodies differ not so much in number but in genus. Giles insists that the view of the pluralists, who *phantastice naturas rerum considerant*,[138] would lead to the absurdity that bodies differing in genus (animated and unanimated) are the same numerically. The identity of the body is guaranteed, not by a *forma corporeitatis*, but by the same and only subject (matter) that in one way suffered the determination of the substantial form, and in another way suffered privation in death. It is to the composite of matter and form that Christ's divinity is united, and it is on account of matter as it is deprived of life that we speak of the generic identity of the body. Moreover, another union was not necessary for the resurrection, since the intellectual soul remained always attached to Christ's divinity.[139]

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[135] See Aquinas, *Quodlibet* II, q.1, a.1.
[136] De Wulf 1901 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 52), 85.
[137] De Wulf 1901 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 52), 85.
[138] De Wulf 1901 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 52), 86.
[139] De Wulf 1901 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 52), 87.

5. *Responsio secundum Thomam*

There is no doubt that Aquinas' solution of the unicity of form attracted many followers, not only for its novelty but also for its internal strength. However, it is more likely that *"secundum Thomam"* (which was surreptitiously read as "Thomism") represented a label of convenience against which some masters would place other solutions. Thus, in the often-debated question of the numerical identity of Christ's body, "Thomism" referred to Aquinas' solution rather than to a school of thought in its own right. The group's fixed allegiance revealed by these disputes does not seem to have gone beyond a faithful and *ad litteram* affiliation to a particular way of "determining" a question.

As far as the evidence of the *correctoria* alone goes, all we can say is that certain reactions from the traditional theologians prompted an *ad hoc* defence of the teachings and the person of Aquinas, which at best resulted in lucid clarifications of important theories such as the unicity of substantial form. The influence exercised by Aquinas' teachings upon Dominicans at the end of the thirteenth century did not manifest itself in any homogenous way. Not all Dominicans welcomed Aquinas' innovations (recall Kilwardby, or William Hothum), and even if some of them still acted in the defensive, they seem to have been prompted more by a certain *esprit de corps* than by philosophical conviction. Moreover, there were quite a few non-Dominican manifestations in favour of Aquinas. Some of these were driven by philosophical affinity with Aquinas' theses (like Giles, an Augustinian), others were simply outraged at the spirit of the censures (like Godfrey of Fontaines, a secular master).

As for those who wrote critical pieces in defence of Aquinas, they display heterogeneous intellectual tempers and their reactions reveal to be far more individualistic than has been believed. Some of them seem to have been punctuated by methodical considerations, others were clearly responding to external intervention. Thus, Richard Knapwell was driven not so much by the significance of an attack that came from the Franciscans (Kilwardby, for that matter, set the standard), but by his personal confrontation with Pecham. Knapwell had been busy replying to William de la Mare's direct attack, thus overlooking the prohibition launched by Kilwardby, not only an episcopal authority, but also a Dominican. Knapwell's piece of defence transpires the urgency of the events surrounding him, so that he is initially quite belligerent and only after Pecham's condemnation does he reveal contrition. He dedicates little time to a speculative elaboration of the unicity thesis, and his writing contributes

little more than a gesture of comradeship. Giles of Lessines, on the other hand, appears as a more conscientious scholar in his elaboration of Aquinas' thesis, and certainly displays an awareness of its full import. However, although testifying to an intelligent and (seemingly) unprejudiced adherence to Thomistic principles, isolated cases like Giles' can hardly account for a general, pervasive and uniform emergence of a "Thomistic school"—they were just responding "according to Thomas".

Furthermore, the significance of William de la Mare's corrective should not be underestimated, not so much because he was a Franciscan, but because the correspondence of some of his articles with Tempier's condemnation (which William was careful to point out), retrospectively added a whole new meaning to Tempier's 1277 intervention. The latter had indeed involved Thomistic theses, but only indirectly and somewhat camouflaged by the general character of the condemnation. Now, with William's polemical piece, the correspondence between the two lists served as a sort of highlight of the Thomistic theses previously only hidden amongst the morass of Tempier's articles. This dialogue between a Franciscan reaction and an official, episcopal, condemnation is more likely what triggered a Dominican response and tinged the whole controversy with a partisan tone.

Aquinas' theses therefore certainly spurred some cohesion among Dominicans, but this seems to have been more circumstantial and "nominal", as it were, than a profound intellectual movement—at least not at the end of the thirteenth century. Aquinas had left a mark in his Order—and indeed in the learned world—as a profound and original theologian. It was then understandable that the blemish of his name could have been seen as having a direct negative impact in that of his Order's. Hence the reactions from Dominicans (and non-Dominicans) from all quarters and positions up to the Roman Curia, the latter perhaps incited (we do not know) by more mundane reasons than we want to believe.

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